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Editorial Archive 

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     January 2008  Green Labor or blue-collar betrayal ?
     November 2007  Howard: enter stage dry, exit stage wet
     September 2007  Skills and collaboration, not WorkChoices, deliver economic success
     August 2007  If housing depends on a vision for our cities, try 'opportunity urbanism'
     June 2007  Value judgements, conflicting assumptions, undermine Climate Institute 'research'
     May 2007  Coal mining will outlast green hysterics                                                                           #republished by On Line Opinion
     April 2007  Carbon trading hasn't worked - mandate clean technologies
     March 2007  Labor can relive its economic glory days
     February 2007  Workers flee Sydney's unaffordable housing                                                                  #republished by On Line Opinion
     December 2006  Green judiciary a looming menace to workers
     November 2006  Don't sacrifice workers on altar of climate change                                                        #republished by On Line Opinion
     October 2006  Progressivism now a preserve of the privileged
     September 2006  Labor's presidency hijacked by activists
     August 2006  Blogosphere has little to offer Labor
     July 2006  Farewell to the tree-hugging premiers: state Labor's new course
     June 2006  The suburban economy and its enemies                                                                          #featured on PLANETIZEN
     May 2006  Exposing the left's strange economic hyper-rationalism
     April 2006  A caucus of Carmens? Some thoughts on Labor's 'insoluble' problem                      #republished by On Line Opinion
     March 2006  Is environmental sustainability socially unsustainable?
     January 2006  "Rocky" Iemma dodges the green corner
     October 2005  The final repudiation of Ben Chifley
     August 2005  Nuclear energy: power for the people?
     June 2005    Labor and refugees - clear vision in the eye of the storm
     March 2005   Tax dollars keep the inner city dream alive
     January 2005   Winning back the disenchanted

       


   January 2008

                                                                 Green Labor or blue-collar betrayal?


A new progressive era?

That Labor’s return to office would be framed in grandiose terms, as a watershed shift from social conservatism to progressivism, was easy to predict. ‘But could this election portend a new progressive era?’, asked journalist Andrew West, hopefully. Predictable perhaps; but also delusional. Certainly, some symbolic ‘firsts’ have cascaded for the benefit of myth-makers: first female deputy prime minister, first openly gay minister who also happens to be of Chinese origin, first ministry containing so many women, and signing-up to Kyoto as a first item of business. The voters who mattered, though, were moved by more down-to-earth concerns. WorkChoices, the cost of living, interest rates and John Howard’s long time in office were decisive.

The new government’s own longevity depends on how well they remember this.

‘The voters who mattered’ were concentrated in those crucial suburban and regional electorates which changed hands. Once they were solid Labor supporters. Then they morphed into Howard battlers. Now they’re just swinging voters who’ll support whichever party appeals to them. They aren’t so many prodigal sons and daughters returning to their ‘natural’ party. A realignment - or more accurately, a disalignment - did occur in 1996. But it was Paul Keating who fractured Labor’s base. Howard just did a good job of holding on to a slab for so long.

Thereafter the old Whitlamite strategy was doomed. No stable majority can be forged by grafting middle class progressives onto a more conservative working class. In today’s shifting and fragmented landscape, a government with Whitlamite ambitions would be at serious risk. Judging by their campaign style, none of this is news to Kevin Rudd or senior party operatives.

Still, things could go wrong on another level.

Look at how things work in the information society. Across social policy fronts, networks of institutions, ‘experts’, activists and media gravitate toward lines of conventional thinking, often progressivist in tendency. This is underpinned by some long-term trends. Workforce polarisation between a growing class of knowledge workers and the broad mass of (blue and white collar) routine workers; socio-economic disparities between inner-urban and outer-suburban or rural regions; the pervasive reach and conformism of communications media - these, to name a few, are narrowing the social sources of our politics.

Acting as gatekeepers, such networks aim to define the limits of acceptable discourse. Some of the new ministers are from their ranks. Others will slide into well-established policy tracks, without due attention to alternatives. All the while, conventional thinking is liable to clash with sentiment out in the suburbs and regions.


The greatest moral challenge?

Let’s dwell on climate change, which dominated the government’s early colour and movement. Kevin Rudd likes to call it one of the greatest moral challenges of our time. He may regret raising the bar so high. In choosing this style of language, Mr Rudd takes his cue from the environment movement, which insists on framing the issue in terms of moral culpability. They never tire of carping about Australia’s high emissions per capita and ‘inaction’ over the last eleven years. As the public will come to understand, neither of these mean much. The volume of our emissions is too small. Nor are most Australians guilt-stricken about our industrial progress over the last century. Whether or not global warming is a by-product, industrial capitalism lifted millions out of poverty in the developed world, and now does so throughout developing world.

We need not atone for any crime. To start with, Mr Rudd should step off the moral pedestal and keep it real (as Ali G would say).

To date, high emitting nations have adopted a consistent approach to climate change, best described as pussyfooting around. The outcome in Bali was more of the same. None are prepared to inflict real pain on their peoples for the sake of global warming. The big-talking Europeans are short of their Kyoto targets, and it’s easier for them than countries like the US and Australia. Many EU states switched to cleaner energy sources, like nuclear, decades ago (for reasons unrelated to climate) and they’re not major energy exporters. The Americans are entitled to doubt their bona fides. A lot of Europe’s cuts, such as they are, accrued from dismantling clapped-out industrial plant in the former eastern bloc. Still, Europeans as a whole are making a meal of it, and their emissions trading scheme is a joke. As for the British, while they claim to have met their Kyoto targets, unlike the continent, a team of Oxford economists led by Dieter Helm dismisses such claims as ‘illusory’.

In the meantime, China and India, leading the developing pack, cling to the UN’s ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ formula, meaning they plan to take a back seat, however much their rocketing emissions exceed ours. Stuck on the moral pedestal, they blame the developed world. Naturally enough, the Americans refuse to play on an uneven field or pay what amount to green reparations. They are also right to draw a distinction between developing countries advanced on the path to industrialisation like China, and others mired in misery like most African states. Nor can it be assumed that the US position will change easily after Bush’s term. Even if a Democrat enters the White House, the next UN protocol needs to get past the senate (where Republicans have just issued a strongly greenhouse-sceptical report). And in Bali a core of other important countries, including Canada, Japan and Russia were grudging on any kind of targets.

Agitation over climate change resembles a parallel universe. In the first place, while delegates sweltered in Bali, the European Central Bank joined the US Federal Reserve in pumping billions of dollars into the world’s banking system to stave off a downturn in the American economy (on which world growth depends) and, here, Treasurer Wayne Swan lambasted port infrastructure constraints impeding coal exports from Queensland. In the second place, European and Australian delegations in Bali favoured (only in principle) near-term developed country targets which would hobble the American economy and put a dent in the international coal market. The first of these actions happened in the real world; the second on fantasy island.

It‘s easy to explain this outbreak of foot-dragging. Consider that the IPCC forecasts global average temperatures rising by a range of 1.8 degrees to 4 degrees over the coming century, and its worst case scenarios are based on speculative assumptions about growth rates and the world’s adaptive capacity. Political leaders are left weighing up a remotely possible chance of climate cataclysm against an absolutely certain prospect of damage to their economies. Make no mistake, the sort of targets pushed by the UN entail economic pain. Hence the big talking and pussyfooting around. This is also Australia’s position. As things now stand, the government has deferred everything until economist Ross Garnaut reports in June. This was a convenient let-out in Bali. A person of integrity, Garnaut laid it on the line from the start. The world’s response to climate change, he says, could end the ‘Platinum Age’ of accelerated world growth over recent years.

Indeed, repeated claims by the Climate Institute and others that we can enact deep cuts - even achieve carbon neutrality - while barely noticing are nonsense. Worse, they’re a cruel hoax. The pain will be felt most deeply by blue-collar workers, and other riff-raff who don’t seem to matter. Dr Philip D Adams of Monash University estimates that an emissions trading scheme will cost us 1.3 per cent of GDP by 2030, ‘equivalent to a reduction of around $21.5 billion a year in today’s dollars’. And as reported by Alan Mitchell in the Australian Financial Review (12 December 2007), former ABARE director Dr Brian Fisher says Labor’s renewable energy target alone, aside from anything else, will cost the economy $1.5 billion and 3600 jobs in 2020. Rosy scenarios ignore the danger of sectional dislocation, even if the aggregate growth outcomes look benign.

Commentator Ross Gittins also wears rose-coloured glasses. He is the author of Gittinomics, which should have been called ‘gentronomics’, since it’s about arranging the nation’s affairs to suit inner-suburban professionals. Gittins opened a column last June with this gruff declaration: ‘next time you hear someone advocating some project or policy change on the grounds that it would create jobs, close your ears.’ Let them eat cake indeed. Turning recently to climate change he says, dismissively, that any cost to GDP won’t be ‘an absolute loss, just an opportunity cost’. Just an opportunity cost for him, but lost job opportunities for thousands of working people. There are few better illustrations of the commentariat’s smug arrogance on this issue.

A worse offender, though, is the Climate Institute, which calls on Australia to step up as a world ‘leader’ in emissions reductions. While the Institute concedes that this entails lower growth for some industries, they typically fail to quantify these impacts or express any concern for the losers. Such adjustments will hurt real people, even if they live beyond the magic circle.

(The Institute has too much influence for comfort. Labor’s illogical pairing of a mandatory renewable energy target with carbon trading appears to have been lifted from them. According to Alan Mitchell, Brian Fisher describes this combination as ‘one of the worst pieces of public policy you can ever imagine’).

Green flacks like the Institute may demand that Australia set the pace. These shadowy fanatics would happily cut a swathe through some of our most important industries. But our minuscule share of global emissions - only 1.4 per cent and set to fall in relative terms even if we do nothing - ill befits us for an avant garde role. It’s a bit like expecting Luxembourg to have led the recent EU treaty negotiations. There’s no reason why we should take the plunge while the world just dips its toes. Nor should our workers be offered up as guinea pigs. Our touchstone should be prudent and cautious engagement.

The price ain’t right

Fear-mongering, abetted by political opportunism, however, have now spun the energy industry into a state of uncertainty and investment paralysis. In the interests of certainty, prudent and cautious engagement are about to be tossed aside for early action. We have been collectively frog-marched down this dubious route. Despite bipartisan commitment to carbon trading in the form of a ‘cap and trade’ scheme, a deal of respected opinion is ebbing away from this approach. Some prefer carbon taxes or hybrid trade-tax schemes, others old-fashioned research and development subsidies.

Last November, for instance, the venerable Committee for the Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) published a collection of papers which ‘questions the common view that a carbon trading system is better than alternatives such as a carbon tax or a hybrid scheme.’ The contributors include world authorities on climate economics from here and overseas. Similar views have been promoted by Bjorn Lomborg, the ‘sceptical environmentalist’.

When Kyoto’s agenda took off more than a decade ago, the objectives were to cut energy consumption in absolute terms and induce shifts to cleaner sources. Carbon trading was thought to achieve both. Time has brought the first objective into sharper relief, however. As climate change policy moves from the fringes to the mainstream, concerns about the implications for growth and living standards have come to the fore. Hence the surge in scepticism about carbon trading. There is rising interest in ways to stimulate cleaner technologies without the accompanying clamp on consumption. Contributors to the CEDA collection propose different ways to price carbon, but some creative thinkers are challenging the need for any type of carbon price.

Writing in the Harvard Law and Policy Review, authors Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, and others, explain in detail why carbon trading won’t induce the new technologies we need. They argue instead, putting it simply, that public investment in clean technologies, on a large enough scale, will trigger similar investments from the private sector. The carrot of public investment makes the stick of a carbon price redundant. Not only is this course more compatible with dynamic growth, they say, but it is saleable politically. 

Power generation produces 36 per cent of Australia’s carbon emissions. Say we chose to secure our energy industry with a plan combining public investment in research and development with a phased timetable, consistent with technological progress, for the retro-fitting or replacement of old plant and the deployment of new sources. Would this approach damage our growth prospects less than carbon trading? Would it have a less dislocating impact on vulnerable workers? We will never know. The idea won‘t get a hearing. We’re stuck with an agenda conceived by ponderous UN bureaucrats and green ideologues.

Sleepwalking to carbon trading may turn into a rude awakening if the shockwaves reverberate through critical suburban and regional electorates. Then voters will ask why their communities are losing jobs while higher emitting countries do nothing. They’ll ask why they’re paying higher power bills, and why the better-off aren’t paying more. They’ll question what any of this has to do with the world’s climate, drought and water shortages. Ultimately, they’ll demand to know why their government colluded in this trahison des verts and sold out their interests.

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 TNC  20 January  2008                                                                        Like to respond?                                                                        Top/Home

   

 November 2007

                                                                 Howard: enter stage dry, exit stage wet


Unlike many commentators, ranging from Alan Ramsey to Imre Saluszinsky, we don’t think Saturday’s election result is a foregone conclusion. Even though every poll since Kevin Rudd became Labor leader has strongly favoured the ALP, a substantial but not unprecedented last-minute swing to the conservatives, combined with their (grossly unfair) buffer of about two percentage points (which would get the Coalition over the line with barely 48 per cent of the two-party-preferred vote), may still be enough to save Howard’s bacon.

We also don’t subscribe to the view that should Howard lose, it will be down to voter ennui: that the Government’s economic record over their 11 years in office would somehow entitle them to feel electorally hard done by. As we argued in March and September, the Howard Government’s economic performance has been patchy and often downright irresponsible. It has enjoyed and capitalised on considerable good fortune on two fronts: inheriting an economy that previous Labor governments had reformed and modernised, and enjoying the fruits of an unprecedentedly long and strong resources boom.

John Howard came to power in 1996 on the back of voter disenchantment – much of it in Labor’s traditional heartland – with the Keating Government’s social and cultural agenda. Howard, like Ronald Reagan before him, presented himself successfully as the true friend of the battlers who had been deserted by their ‘natural’ party, and for a while he lived up to the image. In this he was helped in no small part by the reluctance of the party he had defeated to face up to the implications of their defeat (see our colleague Michael Thompson’s vain attempt to influence the findings of the Hawke-Wran review in 2002).

However, his last – and probably, though by no means certainly, his final – three terms have seen him revert to form: a big and reckless spender in pursuit of social and cultural ends that are in some ways as much at odds with the mainstream as were Keating’s.

This election campaign has become something of a reprise of 1983, with Howard as Prime Minister on the same frantic and desperate vote-buying spree in 2007 as he was as Malcolm Fraser’s Treasurer 25 years ago. In the past, when challenged privately about this previous chapter, Howard has responded that Fraser refused to listen to his advice – a claim that is given some credence in the 2002 memoirs of the tinder-dry former Federal Liberal MP John Hyde:

‘By the time of the [1982] budget, Howard had been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position. It had become apparent to the backbench that fiscal management had been taken out of his and Treasury’s hands by a Cabinet determined to “buy the election”. He could have resigned in protest, but if he had removed his voice from Cabinet, not only would he have been blamed for the forthcoming inevitable defeat; the budget would have been even worse. My opinion, which I voiced, was that he should not resign’ (p 206).

However, given Howard’s behaviour this time around, one is entitled to question the candour of his disavowals, to Hyde and others, of responsibility for Fraser’s profligacy.

Annabel Crabb quipped that Rudd’s honest answer to Rove McManus’s staple ‘Who would you turn gay for?’ question would be Reserve Bank Governor Glenn Stevens. It sounds right at several levels: (1) Kevin comes across as a bit of a nerd (not that there’s anything wrong with that); (2) Stevens did what Costello swore blind wouldn’t happen and raised interest rates in the middle of an election campaign; (3) Rudd says that he, unlike Howard and Costello, will take seriously Stevens’s blunt and repeated warnings to rein in fiscal policy or face the interest rate consequences.

On this last score, Labor’s modest election spending commitments relative to those of the Coalition (about $10 bn less if tax expenditures are included, as they should be) are an encouraging sign that he means it.

It is of course fair to ask, as Howard has done, just what should be done with the huge Commonwealth budget surpluses that have been racked up in recent years as a result of the booming economy. There are only three possibilities: save them, spend them or give them back as tax cuts. The first is less of an imperative now that Commonwealth debt has been pretty much retired, and the third – as Stevens and others warn – risks overheating an economy already operating at or beyond capacity. This pretty much leaves the second option.

So how to spend the surpluses responsibly and without overstimulating the economy? The answer lies in a dispassionate analysis of the medium and long-term challenges we know this country will face.

The immediate and medium-term challenge is persistent skill shortages. They constrain innovation and business development, and threaten our industries’ global competitiveness. When the resources boom starts to peter out, our exposure in world markets will be manifest. We will sink or swim on the quality of our products and services relative to those of our fierce competitors.

The Howard Government has neglected education and skills development. They talk about the additional skills investment they’ve made during their years in office, but other developed countries have mostly invested more strongly over the same period (and much of the Howard Government’s investment has calculatedly avoided the State and Territory TAFE systems), so we have slipped sharply relative to them. Labor has committed to tackling this issue responsibly, with an investment of $600 million over four years to allow employers to tender for the training they need through industry skills councils, resulting in an estimated 450,000 additional training places that will be concentrated heavily at the higher skill levels, including an extra 65,000 traditional apprenticeships.

Rudd has also shown himself willing to invest in modernising our school systems (a sharp contrast with Howard’s preoccupation with winning the history wars), although we do question the value of investing in laptops as the key technological driver of improved educational performance.

The longer team threats arise from our ageing population. Declining workforce participation and sharply rising social security and health care costs as the older aged share of the population increases will impose a huge burden on future wage earners. There are three things we should be, but under Howard mostly haven’t been, doing now in anticipation of this challenge:


1. modernising our health care system, with particular emphasis on preventative and community care (as distinct from hospitals)


2. building workforce skills to offset the dampening effect on growth of falling participation (and indeed to some extent slowing the decline in participation itself – the higher a person’s skill level, the more likely they are to join and remain in the workforce)


3. increasing the compulsory superannuation rate from the 9 per cent it has been throughout Howard’s term of office to something like the 15 per cent rate that is necessary to enable the typical worker to fund their own retirement.

The world is dismissively critical of other countries – notably some oil-rich states – that squander their windfall wealth on gross (and usually highly skewed) consumption without a thought for the future. Australia today is to some extent in this position – we should be investing much more responsibly.

Kevin Rudd, if he wins on Saturday, will command enormous authority in the Labor caucus. He has already flagged that he, not caucus and the factions, will have the final say over the composition of his ministry, and in this we applaud him. We have every confidence that, certainly in his first term, he will have little difficulty staring down the spendthrift and social engineering elements in caucus.

A defeated Coalition will confront major problems – at least as severe as Labor has faced in the post-1996 years. The senior conservative office holder in this country will be (at least for a time) the Lord Mayor of Brisbane. The party will have been rebuffed for failing its self-styled key criterion for holding office: its status as the better and more trusted economic managers. And its second-most electorally successful leader ever will be remembered as the man who didn’t know when to let go; whose legacy will be pored over and picked apart for a few months, then all but forgotten. Hubris often exacts a terrible cost, in life as in the ancient tragedies.

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 TNC  21 November 2007                                                                    Like to respond?                                                                                             Top


    September 2007                                

                                         Skills and collaboration, not WorkChoices, deliver economic success

If we weren’t the first to say it, we were certainly quick off the mark. In our March 2007 editorial, we said that compared to the prime years of economic reform and responsibility under Bob Hawke and Paul Keating in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Howard Government’s economic record has been patchy at best.

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We also said the ALP should not shy away from a campaign fight on economic management – first because it wouldn’t work (the electorate would quickly sense Labor’s discomfort and penalise them for it); second and more importantly because the courage and imagination Hawke Labor displayed in a much more difficult economic environment than Howard ever faced represents a positive message to put before the electorate.

Since then, we’ve been treated to Peter Costello’s damning assessment, in the Errington-van Onselen biography published in July, of John Howard as Malcolm Fraser’s Treasurer (‘had not been a great reformer’; ‘not a success in terms of interest rates and inflation’) and as a profligate spender in election campaigns (‘I have to foot the bill and that worries me, and then I start thinking about not just footing the bill today, but if we keep building in all these things, footing the bill in 5 and 10 and 15 years, and you know, I do worry about the sustainability of these things’).

In this light, you have to wonder what Costello privately thinks about Howard’s latest round of populism and pork-barrelling:


1. bailing out the Mersey Hospital in Tasmania – ‘a disaster’ that ‘should be closed’, according to the honest if indiscreet Tasmanian Liberal Senator Stephen Parry; ‘almost certain … to result in the death of north-west Tasmanians’ because it will ‘cement in place a system in which adverse events will flourish’, according to Professor Jeff Richardson, who chaired the expert advisory group on hospitals in Tasmania


2. offering to fund plebiscites in minuscule, grossly uneconomic Queensland local government areas threatened with amalgamation.

Both these decisions send the message to State premiers that correct and courageous decisions to address entrenched problems, based on sound technical and financial advice, carry too high a political price. This, mind you, from a prime minister who never tires of berating the Labor premiers for their ‘wastefulness’.

The most recent development in this regard has been the change of political tune at The Australian. In a startling editorial on 30 August, they stated that ‘set against the microeconomic reforms of the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments during the 1980s and ’90s, the Howard reform legacy is thin … The great legacy of the Hawke and Keating years was the conditions it set for sustained productivity growth. Labor has pledged to refocus on productivity growth if it wins office. Against this, there is little to indicate that Mr Howard and the Treasurer have used their time in office to set the country up for the decades ahead ... [The Howard Government] has been content to consume the fruits of the present economic boom and take the luxury of the soft option.’

The ALP has made up some ground on the Coalition in the poll question of which party would better manage the economy, although they still lag by between 10 and 20 points. There are good grounds for thinking that if the gap persists to election day, it may cost them victory.

 

This is perhaps the most compelling reason for Labor to campaign from the front on economic management. It becomes doubly important to ensure that shadow ministers and candidates – especially but not exclusively those on the Left – are given no leeway to present off-key messages about, for example, the need for expensive social programs to redress areas of neglect and injustice.

The biggest threat to the longevity of a Rudd Labor government comes from the likely post-election triumphalism that is already emerging in anticipation of a sweeping Labor victory among elements of the Left and the greens. Several commentators, including Phillip Adams, Hugh Mackay and The Age’s Catherine Deveny, see the coming poll as the electorate turning their backs on Howard for his ‘wedging’, authoritarianism and dishonesty. They’re licking their lips in anticipation of his humiliation.

But as Imre Salusinszky pointedly asks, where’s the evidence that the Left’s cultural warriors, who have been crying in the wilderness for 11 years, now suddenly have the ear of the voter?

The danger is that these elements will gain sway in the corridors of power – that hard Left and inexperienced ministers, egged on by their advisers inside and beyond parliament, will pursue agendas that are socially and culturally at odds with the views of mainstream voters, and will chip away at the macroeconomic responsibility that Rudd continues to display.

 

We saw it in 1993 – though on that occasion it was Prime Minister Keating himself who led the triumphalist band – with catastrophic results for Labor three years down the track.

Fortunately Rudd seems to understand this danger all too well. He told Salusinszky several months ago that he thinks voters support him because they grew tired of the Howard Government some time back, but wouldn’t support in sufficient numbers either Beazley (seen as too soft) or Latham (too volatile), whereas they see him as ‘every bit as conservative, temperamentally cautious and safe-handed as Howard’.

 

There’s no joy there for those on the Left who are eagerly anticipating a reprise of 1972.

We also said in March that WorkChoices can be presented as a detriment not just to fairness, but also to our economic future. The Government and its business allies are engaged in concerted advertising campaigns that are as dishonest (the business campaign, which slyly knocks over a straw man) as they are outrageous (how dare the government make us foot the bill for such blatantly partisan propaganda).

 

It’s hard to know whether the advertisements are working as intended – some think they’re turning the industrial relations issue around, others that they’re just drawing attention to the elephant in the room (why all the fuss if there’s nothing to worry about).

In fact there’s now not much difference between the parties on industrial relations as Ross Gittins, for one, points out. In a nutshell, the ALP wants to trade off a little flexibility for a bit more fairness. The differences between the parties boil down to these:


1. Labor would abolish (over five years, for those earning under $100,000) Australian Workplace Agreements and restore collective bargaining, with or without unions, for those who choose it


2. Labor would reinstate substantially watered-down unfair dismissal provisions for employees of small businesses


3. Labor would restore a modified award system as the basic safety net, against which all agreements (except for those earning more than $100,000) would be tested for fairness – however, the awards would be constrained to cover just 10 ‘allowable matters’.

Three points need to be made about these differences.

 

First, they bear almost no resemblance to the nightmare scenario portrayed in the deceitful business advertising campaign. Contrary to the picture presented of burly union thugs storming into hapless small businesses and shutting them down, union officials are and will continue under a Labor government to be ‘legally required to have a permit and must give notice of their intention to enter business premises, must have valid reasons for entering, and an employer may impose conditions on how they carry out a visit’ (Colin Fenwick, director of Melbourne University’s Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law).

As for the alleged costs of ‘scrapping workplace reform’ documented in the EconTech report commissioned by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the campaign, these are derived from a model into which ‘so-called facts’ have been fed that ‘have absolutely nothing to do with the ALP’s industrial relations policy’ (Colin Fenwick again).

The second point is that – yes, it’s true – Labor’s modest industrial relations reforms will come at an (even more modest) price. Other things being equal, businesses will hire more workers if they are allowed to sack them on a whim, and (particularly during economic downturns) if they are given leeway to cajole, intimidate or con workers out of hard-won entitlements in return for inadequate offsetting pay increases.

 

It’s an old argument: where’s the ideal balance between fairness and flexibility; between giving relatively powerless individuals collective rights and giving business a free hand to thrive.

The balance we reached before the introduction of WorkChoices was in fact far closer to the United States end of the developed countries spectrum than the Western European end. There’s substance to the charge that Howard wants to push us right to – indeed, as far as bargaining rights are concerned, beyond – the US extreme.

The final point to make is that WorkChoices, in its philosophy, its message and its impact, works directly counter to the other, far more pressing, industrial imperative: to build the workplace skills that are critical to this country’s long-term economic competitiveness. Roughly speaking, 80 per cent of Australian jobs have a clearly defined educational and skills pathway (tertiary or vocational), but below 50 per cent of workers have the qualifications and/or recognised skills that attach to these jobs.

 

We muddle through at present – as we have for decades – but the skills gap (one manifestation of which is widespread skill shortages) will continue to widen, particularly under the impact of the ageing population and falling labour force participation rate.

In time – particularly when the current resources boom peters out – we’ll find ourselves scarcely able to compete in the global marketplace unless we’ve quite radically transformed our skill formation patterns.

Unions can and should be a vital partner in this process. (As we noted in March, Australia’s robust apprenticeship system owes everything to the past strength of our unions.) They are critical to encouraging workers, particularly blue-collar workers, to participate in training and skills development, and to reassuring those who understandably find this threatening. They can and will ensure that collective agreements adequately provide for, and appropriately recognise and reward, skills acquisition.

Workers themselves need the reassurance that their employer values them sufficiently to make skills acquisition a desirable option. Small business overall lags sharply behind large and medium firms in its investment in and commitment to training – this discrepancy largely accounts for Australia’s generally poor skills profile. It is essential that we restore the element of partnership between business, workers and unions that was so carefully built up during the Hawke years.

Important research in the neurosciences shows that people (indeed, animals generally) fail to learn when they are under stress, anxious and unhappy. John Merson, a senior lecturer in the School of Science and Technology Studies at UNSW, argues that this probably goes a long way to explaining why low socioeconomic status correlates so closely with inferior learning outcomes – it’s not just poverty per se; the anxiety and unhappiness that poverty engenders are as much to blame.

 

Merson draws several lessons from this research, one of which – that ‘the “right” balance is needed in students’ emotional as well as cognitive load’– is especially relevant in this context. ‘Optimum engagement with learning’, he writes, ‘lies in that zone where the challenge is demanding enough to be enticing, but not so great as to be daunting’.

This goes to the heart of the question as to what sort of workplace we need to meet the skills challenge. An insecure, antagonistic workplace that pits people against each other and individually against a much better armed boss, where work is a tedious routine and two-way loyalty is passé, is the very antithesis of what is needed.

 

 TNC  22 September 2007                                                                 Like to respond?                                                                                          Top


   
      August 2007                                     

                                                    If housing depends on a vision for our cities, try ‘opportunity urbanism’

Suburbia: reports of its death are greatly exaggerated 

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A much quoted assertion in the housing debate came from Rory Robertson, financial analyst at Macquarie Bank. ‘There’s this never satisfying compromise between proximity, being close to the action’, said Robertson, ‘and the size of houses and yards and as our cities get bigger, literally, there’s less room for everyone to be living in nice houses with big yards’.

Presumably, by ‘bigger’ Robertson means more populous. Hence population growth, according to his formula, plus wanting to be ‘close to the action’, equal the end of home ownership for the masses.

Australians have again been subjected to a round of claims and counter-claims about housing affordability. The issue is now deeply entangled in a pre-election web of partisan and federal-state rivalries. Clearly, the contenders are partial to one economic doctrine or another, but they also bring clashing assumptions, if not to say prejudices, about how cities work.

A champion of the ‘land-supply-is-irrelevant’ school, Robertson expresses a timeworn, monocentric conception of urban development. He imagines a single core ‘close to the action’. There is little sign he fully understands how fast this pattern is fading away. Writing that ‘what most of us aspire to is better-located homes - homes that are closer to the centre of the city‘, Ross Gittins, the Sydney Morning Herald’s economics editor, is stuck in the same time warp.

Like many others, Robertson and Gittins lurch from the incomplete premise that inner suburbs are attractive to home buyers, to the flawed conclusion that most are choosing medium to high density living or renting over low density ownership. The initial question, though, isn’t where buyers want to live, but how. Analysts and commentators, mostly well-paid professionals, presume too much about consumer preferences.

Surveys and historical experience confirm that most Australians aspire to own single family, detached dwellings on sizable blocks. This majority may be defined by parameters like age, family size and employment status.

Only then comes the question of where buyers want to live. In an ideal world without constraints, purchasers would opt for upmarket, well-serviced localities close to established infrastructure. In the real world, this is beyond their reach - at least in most cases. It doesn’t follow, however, that they are content to rent, or settle for high density units or town houses. They will pursue their preference to the periphery - especially low and middle income earners - providing, and this is the crucial condition, price levels justify the trade-off.

This brings us to the current state of the market. The likes of Robertson and Gittins assume prices won’t ever warrant the trade-off. They cite the case of outer western Sydney, where developers are struggling to attract buyers though values have been sliding since 2004. At the same time, inner suburban prices are stable or rising.

The crucial point, however, is that outer suburban prices have declined from historically high peaks (also high by world standards, as the Demographia survey makes plain). And prices remain unpalatable to borrowers, especially in a phase of escalating interest rates. New houses are still coming onto the market for at least $350,000 in western Sydney. That’s too high for low and middle income earners. Why are prices unacceptable when the market is so weak? If there is ‘no demand’, as the NSW Government puts it, why haven’t prices collapsed? Why haven’t supply and demand produced an equilibrium price? These are the great unasked questions.

The answer, of course, is that zoning regulations, resulting in artificial scarcity, state and local government charges, and developer on-costs have placed a floor under prices. According to Alan Moran of the Institute of Public Affairs, Sydney zoning controls invest greenfields lots with a value of around $115,000, while charges come to $122,000 and development on-costs range from $40,000 to $60,000. The Housing Industry Association’s estimates are comparable.

These claims are contested by the NSW Government. Nevertheless, there is a compelling case for review, not just of the amounts estimated, but, more importantly, of the planning philosophy behind them. It’s true that housing is different from many other products. Supply comes to the market on certain conditions. Lots must be connected to roads, electricity, water mains and sewerage. But current zoning restrictions, charges and on-costs go far beyond these essential amenities.

Over recent decades, the field of town planning has embraced a distinctly paternal agenda. According to this worldview, the traditional suburb was a wasteland of social isolation, alienation and dysfunction, not to mention sheer ugliness. For a variety of reasons, state governments have, on the whole, bought this line. Forget that it doesn’t match the experience of millions who flocked to suburbia during the post-war era. Residential development must only proceed, according to the planners, on sites enveloped by a full-blown network of infrastructure and services.

Any responsible government will aim for equal access to social services over time. But there is another powerful consideration. Is access to full-blown infrastructure and services compatible with general home ownership? Is it reasonable for governments (state and local) to say the public can have home ownership with the full suite of infrastructure and services or not at all?

Debate is raging on whether developers and buyers or consolidated revenue should cough up for these expenditures. There is a more basic objection, however. When charges and on-costs are earmarked for discretionary priorities like ‘community facilities’, libraries, swimming pools, playgrounds, child care centres, public transport and certain energy and water saving devices, government is pre-empting lifestyle decisions that rightly belong to home buyers themselves. It’s also foreclosing on a trade-off between superior amenities and the prospect of home ownership.

People should be free to make their own choices.

‘Engines of upward social mobility’

Our housing affordability crisis emerges from the debris of a failed planning ideology, embodied in the term ‘environmental, social and economic sustainability’. This common, if nebulous, phrase denotes a seamless garment of mutually reinforcing wisdom. In practise ‘environmental sustainability’, as conceived by most environmentalists and planners, is far from compatible with social and economic sustainability (whatever that may mean).

The economic success of our cities rests on different foundations than it did two decades ago. Aside from the special case of zones directly plugged into the global economy, like the concentration of advanced business services and high-tech innovation known as Sydney’s ‘global arc corridor’, economic vibrancy is associated with geographical dispersion. The impact of globalisation on regulation, taxes, and the growth of the services economy, together with modern communications and transport systems, have liberated businesses. Today economic opportunity is more often a function of mobility, abundant cheap land and population growth.

Urban theorists have long discussed ‘globalisation and the rise of city-regions’. According to this line of thought, ‘a world-wide mosaic of large city-regions seems to be overriding an earlier core-periphery system of spatial organization’. The world’s growth cities display polycentric and decentralised patterns of commercial development and residential settlement. Recent commentary in Forbes Magazine pointed out that the fastest growing localities in the United States, recorded in the latest census, were suburbs of sun-belt cities like Sacramento, Phoenix and Dallas-Fort Worth, where ‘geographic growth is almost completely unregulated’.

Examining another booming sun-belt city, Houston, urbanist Joel Kotkin proposes a theoretical perspective he calls ‘opportunity urbanism’. ‘Opportunity cities’, he explains, ‘generate economic opportunity across the entire income spectrum, for all racial and ethnic groups, and across all education levels’. The crucial ingredients are job growth and basic affordability, especially housing affordability. ‘In contrast, as other communities become built-out and reach their development boundaries, the lack of available land constrains their ability to provide new, reasonably-priced housing options’.

The notion of an urban core ‘where the action is’, as Robertson puts it, is misconceived. ‘During the last half-century’, writes Kotkin, ‘telecommunications and transportation revolutions have made it possible for [major corporations] to locate themselves away from traditional business centres’. Increasingly, this trend is observable across our major cities.

Earlier this year the Australian Financial Review reported that ‘average office rents in the nation’s suburban office precincts rose 8.4 per cent last year’, and recently ran a report of ‘32 office buildings changing hands in the Sydney suburban market during the financial year at prices in excess of $5 million - a total turnover of $900 million’. Last month the country’s largest general insurer, Insurance Australia Group, announced plans to relocate a number of divisions from Sydney CBD to Parramatta.

Contrary to the myth of desolate, dormitory suburbs, reached by tedious commutes from a distant city centre, more outer suburban residents are working closer to home. Kotkin points out that

…for most residents of newer cities, such as Houston, the automobile will remain the prevailing means of transit. One explanation is that most jobs are not clustered around a rail line or bus route, but rather are scattered throughout a metro area. This makes the kind of point-to-point travel offered by the automobile particularly helpful.

These dispersive trends have accelerated during recent years, leading to the phenomenon that The Brookings Institution’s Rob Lang has called “edgeless cities”, where employment becomes more spread out and less accessible to traditional mass transit.


Contemporary fringe suburbs are more diverse, both socially and economically, than their counterparts of the early post-war era. This is as much a function of economic trends as of planning measures, if not more so. And residential development is vital to their prosperity, along with spin-off industries.

Reporting on the downturn in Sydney’s growth over 2006, William Mitchell and Anthea Bill of Newcastle University stress that ‘the housing boom stimulates economic activity as households renovate and expand their consumption of household items (as they feel wealthier)…Then as the housing market slows the broader activity associated with it (construction, retailing, finance and insurance, manufacturing, etc) also slackens’. Just as resources are driving the northern and western states, residential development is integral to the whole south-east Australian region. In this economy, restrictive planning can generate ripples of social distress.

Inevitably, planners will retort that opportunity urbanism just isn’t environmentally sustainable. Some will misapply the concept of ‘ecological footprint’, the amount of land area required to sustain a particular lifestyle. It is often said, for instance, that Sydney’s footprint is equivalent to forty-nine per cent of New South Wales. Yet this shibboleth has been slammed, as it wrongly assumes a portion of land can only be used for one purpose at a time.

Others claim suburban growth will send carbon emissions soaring. In a field where pseudo-scientific notions jostle for attention, ‘ecological footprint’ has lost ground to ‘carbon footprint’. Bear in mind that Australia produces only 1.5 per cent of global emissions. Also consider that Patrick Troy and Bill Randolph of the City Futures Research Centre found ‘tenants and those in flats are in less control of their immediate accommodation and have much less capacity to effect a meaningful transition to lower energy use’. Little wonder that according to the Australian Conservation Foundation’s consumption atlas, ‘people living in Australia’s wealthiest inner-city suburbs are responsible for more than double the amount of greenhouse pollution than households in less affluent areas’, such as low density fringe suburbs.

None of this will detach planners from their dreams of compact European-style cities.

Elite objections aside, however, most Australians will agree there are lessons from the success stories of the American sun-belt, considering similarities in climate, population densities, land resources, values and lifestyles. After all, Australians too have cherished their cities, in Kotkin’s resonant phrase, as ‘engines of upward social mobility’.

 TNC  8 August 2007                                                                    Like to respond?                                                                                               Top


   
 

 June 2007

                                Value judgements, conflicting assumptions undermine Climate Institute ‘research’

On 28 May, ABC radio bulletins were abuzz with news of new research ‘showing power costs would rise less if the Government moved quickly to bring in a mix of measures, including emissions trading, than if it waited’.

The source of that research was not a university, research institution, industry association or government agency, but rather a ‘greenhouse lobby group’, as the ABC called it – the Climate Institute of Australia (CI). As a rule, the ABC isn’t in the business of promoting lobby groups. Why then was this research accorded such prominent coverage and presented as self-evidently true?

The habit of media outlets, particularly at the progressive end of the spectrum, to confer authoritative status on green lobbies is a fact of modern life. The point is made well by former British MP Dick Taverne in The March of Unreason:

Just as parties are a necessary part of democracy, environmental lobbies play an important part in making people and governments aware of environmental issues. But blind loyalty to the cause is just as corrupting as tribalism in party politics. In fact it is more dangerous, because the media subject the pronouncements of parties to ruthless criticism, but treat environmental groups like The Soil Association, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth as independent authorities above criticism, as if they were a sort of collective Mother Theresa. There is a general feeling that since they are trying to save the planet, they must be right.

To those groups mentioned by Taverne, add CI.

Journalists would deny that their positive coverage of CI’s output is driven by shared ideological assumptions about climate change, if not the world at large. They would argue that it is more to do with the organisation’s independence.

According to a press release, CI was founded in 2005 ‘through a $10 million grant from the philanthropic group, the Poola Foundation’. One of CI’s directors, Mark Wootton, is also a director of Poola, which distributes the bequest of the late Tom Kantor, the brother of Mr Wootton’s wife Eve. The foundation disburses most of its money to environmental projects.

Another of CI’s directors is Clive Hamilton, better known as Executive Director of the Australia Institute, a progressive think tank. The Australia Institute is also funded by Poola. Hamilton is the author of numerous books and articles on the theme that material affluence is incompatible with wellbeing. CI represents an extension of Hamilton’s obsessions, since global warming is seen as the most serious of many negative by-products of the market economy.

For many observers, CI’s funding by a philanthropic trust attests to the integrity and impartiality of its work. In contrast, researchers funded by commercial concerns are routinely accused of bowing to their paymasters. This tactic is rife when it comes to debates about climate change. There is a knee-jerk tendency to dismiss anyone who questions the IPCC-Kyoto-Stern orthodoxy as being in the pay of some sinister interest.

Yet it may be reasonably argued that the type of grant made in this case, an up-front single capital sum, will inevitably confine CI’s field of vision to enquiries which happen to justify the grant’s purposes. These include ‘raising public awareness and debate about the dangers to Australia of global warming and to motivate the country to take positive action’. As we will see, this results in a tendency to fish around for worst-case scenarios.

A hermetically sealed trust like Poola isn’t subject to commercial or political pressures. Nor is it instinctively sensitive to the day-to-day reality of people who may be damaged by its purist agenda.

Nonetheless, it is rarely productive to prejudge the quality of research into the implications of global warming (or anything else for that matter) on the basis of who funds it. The public interest will only be served if all research, whatever the source, is examined on its merits.

Faking the switch

The CI paper that attracted so much attention on 28 May was Making the Switch: Australian Clean Energy Policies. The underlying assumptions and modelling methodologies are contained in a supplementary report by McLennan Magasanik Associates, ‘one of Australia’s leading electricity sector modellers’.

The principal paper’s headline story, the one that so interested the ABC, assumes a scenario in which the government introduces emissions trading with a ‘soft’ carbon price of $10 a tonne in 2012 and delays ‘full emissions trading’ until 2020. This is called the ‘wait and see’ scenario. If this comes to pass, says the paper, we will have electricity ‘prices around 20 per cent higher in the 2020s, 60 per cent higher in the 2030s and 90 per cent higher in the 2040s’.

‘This rapid price increase’, it is explained, ‘risks significant shocks to the industry and wider economy.’

CI urges the government to go for a ‘mix of policies’ option: full carbon pricing as of 2010, clean energy targets and comprehensive energy efficiency. ‘A mix of policies reduces carbon price increases by around a third and electricity price increase by around 20 per cent over the first two decades of action [sic]’. The precise meaning of this sentence (and many others) isn’t so clear. Apparently, prices would be 20 per cent lower than the ‘wait and see’ scenario outcome.

(ABC newsrooms wouldn’t have appreciated that this isn’t such a dramatic improvement, considering that CI forecasts prices rising by as much as 90 per cent in the 2040s under the wicked ‘wait and see’ scenario.)

As noted above, these findings were reported as pressing and self-evident. Closer examination reveals that the paper is built on a collection of gratuitous value judgments and conflicting or arbitrary assumptions.

Gratuitous value judgements

Making the Switch starts with a familiar premise: ‘No other conclusion can be drawn from the scientific assessments of Australia’s, and the world’s, premier scientific institutions that countries like Australia will need to reduce emissions by 60 to 90 per cent by 2050 [sic]’.

Some researchers and a few national and international agencies have estimated that global emissions need to be reduced by around half from 1990 levels if atmospheric carbon is to be stabilised at safe levels. This is not to say, however, that there are scientific grounds to suggest Australia ‘will need to’ do so. There are no scientific grounds for Australia to do anything. Extinguishing our 1.4 per cent contribution to global emissions will scarcely affect the world’s climate systems. If CI believes there are other grounds for Australia to act, they are not spelt out in the paper. The need to act now is asserted as obvious.

CI, like other green groups, insists the debate on whether Australia should take early action to cut emissions is over. The subject is far from closed, however. Considering our minuscule share of global emissions, and the severe impact such action would have on our fossil fuel dependent, energy exporting economy, the issue ought to be subjected to continuing scrutiny. A model approach is found in the Productivity Commission’s submission to the prime minister’s task group on emissions trading, which contains critical examination of various rationales for early action like avoiding climate change, meeting the Kyoto target, being a good world ‘citizen’ and influencing others, reducing investment uncertainty, and facilitating the transition to a lower emissions economy.

In contrast, CI prefers to indulge in gratuitous value judgments.

‘It is inevitable’, says the paper, ‘there will be winners and losers in the transition to a low carbon economy …’ CI, unlike other green lobbies, concedes that ‘certain greenhouse intensive trade exposed industries such as aluminium production and iron and steel may suffer disproportionate impacts from domestic carbon pricing’. But CI claims the right to decide that some industries deserve to flourish at the expense of others, without any consideration of alternative policy frameworks. The prospect of losers ‘should not be an excuse for inaction across the wider economy’, it says.

CI is cold on nuclear energy because, amongst other things, of ‘public opposition’. On the other hand, public opposition to the closure of power stations or steel and aluminium plants doesn’t rate.

Conflicting assumptions

The modelling behind CI’s benign ‘mix of policies’ assumes there will be emissions trading as of 2010 and a concurrent, if transitional, clean energy target (CET) scheme. This flies in the face of most other commentary on emissions trading.

The paper explains that CET is a market-based mechanism that ‘operates like the Government’s Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) through tradable permits to drive the lowest cost technologies to market’. However, national emissions trading is advocated by many, including the Commonwealth Treasury, precisely because a single all-embracing scheme will eliminate economic distortions produced by piecemeal state and federal abatement measures like MRET. The paper itself says an important purpose of carbon pricing is to ‘create a level playing field for business and consumers’. That message is delivered by several submissions to the PM’s task group, as well as their final report.

Neither Making the Switch nor the supplementary report, however, comments on the potential for emissions trading and CET to cancel each other out. Nor do they attempt to quantify this possibility. Perhaps CI is just ideologically committed to renewable energy and doesn’t trust the market forces generated by emissions trading.

At any rate, this represents a significant rupture in the logic of CI’s argument.

Arbitrary assumptions

As noted, the ‘wait and see’ horror story assumes the government will impose a ‘soft’ carbon price of $10 a tonne from 2012 to 2020 and aim to reduce emissions by 80 per cent from 1990 levels by 2050. The paper was timed to pre-empt the PM’s task group’s final report, and these figures reflect speculation about the report’s recommendations. In the event, the task group didn’t specify a carbon price or target, so CI’s exercise is purely hypothetical. It can be consigned to the category of political tactics rather than economic analysis.

(This may explain another gaping hole in the paper – at no stage does it nominate the appropriate carbon price for ‘full’ emissions trading.)

Nevertheless, it is striking that CI chose the high emissions reduction target of 80 per cent. This served to deliver the alarming figures, but positions CI way out on a limb. Almost everyone else, including the IPCC, Stern, the G8 and Labor, talk about 50 or 60 per cent.

Clearly, CI wants to exert maximum pressure on the government to take strong action now. Perhaps it fears the heat will go out of the issue if, over time, adverse climate predictions are modified or if giant emitters such as the US, the EU and China take matters in hand and let bit players like Australia off the hook. Stressing the need for urgent measures, the paper asserts ‘the costs of inaction through climate change are expected to far outweigh the costs of action’. The sentence bears a footnote to Sir Nicholas Stern's Review.

True to form, however, there is no attempt to balance the discussion by acknowledging the criticisms of Stern’s methodology. A cash sum will be worth less at some future date than it is now. In finance and economics, the discount rate is a percentage by which the current value is reduced to reflect that future lower value. Stern used a low ‘social’ discount rate of 0.1 per cent per year (virtually zero), so that any future costs of climate change emerge as more significant today in financial terms than if he used a higher (and arguably more realistic) discount rate.

Stern’s approach supports the contention that we should bear the costs of abatement action now rather than later. But he has many detractors. William D Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, a foremost expert on the economics of climate change, is but one of those who have questioned Stern’s arbitrary choice of discount rate.

Therein lies a lesson for media outfits like the ABC. Early action is particularly unwise when ascribing authority to green lobbies like the Climate Institute.

 

 TNC  25 June 2007                                                                              Like to respond?                                                                                    Top


   
                                                           

 May 2007

                                                                  Coal mining will outlast green hysterics

‘Not all jobs are good’, says former Liberal Party leader John Hewson.

That assertion, odd for an economist, fell from Hewson’s recent Australian Financial Review column lashing the Government and Labor for appeasing the coal industry over climate change. Neither, he says, will confront the ‘necessary transition’ to an economy without coal mining. ‘Some of those jobs, indeed some of those industries’, writes Hewson, ‘may not be able to be protected, nor should they be’.

More than anything, Hewson’s column encapsulates an important truth about our climate change debates – there is no absolute response; rather, it depends on your socio-economic standpoint.

Over recent decades university graduates engaged in professional or quasi-professional ‘knowledge work’ have grown from a small fraction to over 30 per cent of the workforce. Since this echelon controls the channels of ideas and information, it is hardly surprising that we are bombarded with policy prescriptions that promote, or protect, their interests at the expense of other socio-economic strata. The gentrification of social policy is a prominent feature of contemporary politics. John Howard, ‘the battler’s friend’ is not immune to it. The trend is apparent on issues like ‘work-life balance’, ‘diversity’, urban development, higher education and, last but not least, the environment, especially climate change.

When Hewson says some jobs aren’t good, he’s not thinking of his own. And nor does the whole herd of alarmists bellowing for an end to coal mining.

 

It’s fashionable to assert that ‘transition’ to a decarbonised economy will be relatively painless. Those peddling this myth tend to draw on a series of undigested, and often misunderstood, research papers and reports, starting with last year’s Allen Consulting effort for the Business Council’s Roundtable on Climate Change.

According to the report, greenhouse gas emissions cuts of 60 per cent from year 2000 levels by 2050 would only reduce GDP by 6 per cent less than otherwise. Then came the famous - or infamous, depending on your perspective - Stern Review estimate that ‘the expected annual cost of emissions reductions consistent with a trajectory leading to stabilisation … is likely to be around 1 % of GDP by 2050’. The figure of one per cent was widely described as a sinch. Now, the third instalment of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, released at the recent Bangkok conference, follows in a similar vein, stating that reducing emissions to acceptable levels will cost no more than 3 per cent of global GDP by 2030.

(The IPCC report brought on the inevitable Sydney Morning Herald headline: ‘It won’t cost the earth to save the planet’.)

Such pronouncements are commonly used to dismiss the understandable fears of energy sector investors and unions. One egregious case is the AFR’s Brian Toohey, who claims ‘Australian households and businesses will barely notice the cost of achieving deep cuts to greenhouse gas emissions by 2050’, and adds ‘we could adopt the 80 per cent target set by California’s Republican Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and still find it a breeze to achieve’.

A breeze to achieve? Toohey writes from his own secure perspective. What for him is a breeze, may well be a tornado for thousands of blue-collar families. While progressives call for drastic measures to save our common inheritance, there won’t be common consequences - some will win, others will lose.

In his book What it means to be a Libertarian, American writer Charles Murray addresses this subject of skewed perspectives with admirable clarity. ‘Most environmental measures represent class interests in disguise’, he explains, ‘and involve no public goods worthy of the name’. Writes Murray:

A thought experiment will illustrate what I mean by class interests. Imagine a Congress of the United States that is composed entirely of blue-collar workers and farmers …They identify with blue-collar neighbourhoods, blue-collar incomes, and blue-collar recreations. The rest of this Congress are farmers who know the environment not as an abstraction or an ideal but as a day-to-day reality of their working lives. Let us imagine this new Congress as it turns to the latest proposals for environmental law….

Who is right? The Congress we have now or the Congress of blue-collar workers and farmers? Neither. Many of the currently fashionable environmental positions are arbitrary, and the different rules set by a Congress of blue-collar workers and farmers would be equally arbitrary.


Obviously, some people will suffer dislocation from Kyotoesque emissions cuts, notably workers employed in fossil fuel related industries. On the other hand, most middle class professionals will emerge unscathed or benefit from the process.

Aggregate figures don’t tell the real story. First, there is no unanimity that the impact on GDP growth over time will be negligible. Last year the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) published a much overlooked paper on the economic impacts of climate change policy. The bureau estimated that if we met the Kyoto targets, GDP in 2050 will be 10.7 per cent lower than otherwise. That’s not so trivial. And some environmental economists have come out against Stern’s conclusions, Professors William Nordhaus of Yale and Sir Partha Dasgupta of Cambridge to name just two.

Second, aggregates, national or global, say nothing about the distribution of employment growth over time. Under the hammer of carbon abatement measures, some industry sectors will decline or disappear, while others will expand. In the same paper, ABARE estimated that if we took independent climate action, even in conjunction with global action, by 2050 our coal and ‘non ferrous metal’ industries (measured by output) will be respectively 32 per cent and 75 per cent smaller than otherwise. In contrast ‘services’, where most of our loud-mouth greenies are found, will only be 6 per cent smaller. Few displaced workers will manage the transition to expanding sectors.

That’s something you won’t hear from the assortment of ‘shut-the-mines’ zealots, including the Greens, Greenpeace, the Wilderness Society and the Nature Conservation Council, who assembled in Sydney for a coal crisis summit on 30 April.

It won’t be a ‘breeze’ at all. Our green-tinged middle class can afford to push the whole panoply of Kyotoesque measures like carbon taxes, emissions trading and renewable energy development. As Murray suggests, however, their choices are ‘arbitrary’. There are alternative perspectives.

The starting point, of course, is that domestic action will have no impact on global climate realities. Our population is too small. The coal question, though, has a particular twist. Hardline greens contend that, as a major coal exporter, we are morally culpable for the carbon emitted by end users.

This can only be judged in the overall context of global energy, and specifically, coal markets. Australia is the world’s largest single coal exporter, but we account for 29 per cent of coal exportation. The rest comes from various suppliers, ready to fill the gap created by our withdrawal. Many of these are developing countries with few qualms about carbon emissions. And our largest buyers are Japan and South Korea, not emerging giant emitters like China, India, Brazil and Indonesia or major contemporary emitters like Europe and the US.

Japan, which in 2004-5 bought 54 per cent of our steaming coal and 36 per cent of our coking coal, emits 5 per cent of the world’s carbon. By comparison, the US (24.3 per cent), the European Union (15.3 per cent) and China (14.5 per cent) together emit more than half the total.

The dynamic factor in this mix is China, which is set to overtake the US by 2009. The dimensions of China’s coal consumption are sobering. According to Steve Piper of energy information firm Platts, climate change has done little to spoil the world’s appetite for coal, and China, in particular, is voracious. More than 361 coal-fired power stations have been built by the Chinese since 2002, and 65,000 megawatts (MW) worth of new facilities are under construction. A further 100 stations are planned. About one coal-burning plant is being added to China’s supply capacity per week. Although China mined 2.2 billion tonnes of thermal coal last year, imports have had to rise from two million tonnes in 2001 to 31 million in 2006. The forecast is 36 million this year and 50 million by 2012.

Nor have other countries called a halt. The US has added 27,000 MW of coal-fired capacity since 2002 and plans to develop another 37,700 MW by 2012. In the meantime, Kyoto-signing Europe added 25,000 MW over the last five years and plans an extra 13,000 MW by 2012. And India has projects adding up to 38,000 MW. Overall, 37 countries have plans to build more coal-fired plants, says Piper. By 2012, the world will have 7,500 coal-fired stations in 79 countries.

In short, coal powers 40 per cent of the world’s electricity production and the International Energy Agency projects demand to double by 2030.

Will any of this change if we pull the plug? Not much.

Recently, the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) published a wide-ranging study, The Future of Coal. The study points out that ‘in contrast to oil and natural gas, coal resources are widely distributed around the world’, and ‘coal reserves are spread between developed and developing countries’. One fundamental conclusion: ‘we believe that coal use will increase under any foreseeable scenario because it is cheap and abundant’.

While we are the leading coal exporter, moreover, according to US Department of Energy estimates we only have 8 per cent of the world’s reserves. The largest reserves are concentrated in the United States with 26 percent and the Former Soviet Union with 23 percent, followed by China (12 percent), Germany (7 percent), South Africa (5 percent), Poland (2 percent) and many other countries with smaller shares. Clearly, there are ample substitutes should we pull out.

What can be done? Despite reports that John Howard is negotiating an APEC linked regional emissions trading scheme, the Chinese government, for one, won’t kick the coal habit any time soon. The Communist Party’s hold on power depends on continuing growth at breakneck speed. As China specialist David Lambton pointed out in an article republished by the AFR (from Foreign Affairs), ‘Beijing’s priority is sustained, rapid growth, because growth is fundamental to the regime’s legitimacy - and most everything else’. Hence, last month’s National Climate Change Assessment Report, a document released by China’s top economic planning body, rejected ‘absolute and compulsory’ caps on the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.

Nevertheless, the MIT study expresses confidence that ‘carbon capture sequestration (CCS) is the critical enabling technology that would reduce [carbon dioxide] emissions significantly while also allowing coal to meet the world’s pressing energy needs’. The study estimates that a carbon emission price of $30 (US) per tonne would make CCS cost competitive. The crucial problem is whether the world’s major emitters can be persuaded to implement such an impost, and what form it should take. If, as we have argued, global emissions trading proves to be a pipedream, the only alternative is some type of international agreement - a sort of supersized AP6 - mandating cooperation in the development, dissemination and application of technological improvements.

For such an agreement to emerge, coal suppliers need to be backed by democratically accountable governments, prosperous wealth generating economies and technically skilled populations. In other words, by countries like Australia. Now there’s an alternative perspective for you. If we want to have a real, as opposed to just a symbolic, impact on stabilising atmospheric carbon, we should think about expanding, rather than contracting, our share of the world’s coal supply.

 

This editorial was republished by On Line Opinion, Australia's e-journal of social and political debate.
 

 TNC  22 May 2007                                                                        Like to respond?                                                                                         Top    
 


     
     April 2007

                                                   Carbon trading hasn’t worked – mandate clean technologies

Foggy weather   

A delusional fog seems to have descended on climate change policymaking in Australia. How else to explain the breathless urgency attending moves to carbon trading? It’s not just that carbon trading has a dismal track record. It bears repeating that we produce a puny 1.4 per cent of global emissions. Assuming global warming is mostly man-made, even if we were to adopt a national scheme, and even if we hit a drastic target – say a 60 per cent cut by 2050 – the impact would still be next to zilch. As we have argued, atmospheric carbon will be stabilised by the giants of the northern hemisphere or not at all. We could reduce or raise our emissions by 100 per cent and it would make virtually no difference.

Of course, environmentalists will always insist ‘we must play our part’. Speaking on the ABC’s 7:30 Report, for instance, Professor Graeme Pearman, Sustainability Science Coordinator at Monash University, recently delivered the stock reply: ‘If you look at the emissions of Australia, they’re not that different from the emissions of the UK or from France, or from Sweden. All of these countries have emissions that are approximately the same. So each of these countries could put up their hand and say, “We’re going to opt out of doing anything, because no-one else is doing it”. We have to share the responsibility for actually doing this emissions reduction.’

Australia can’t answer for Europe, and Professor Pearman ignores a host of factors distinguishing us from countries like Britain and France. Consider their longer industrial histories. Consider that their fossil-fuel reserves have already been substantially depleted or abandoned, spurring a decades-old switch – unrelated to climate change – towards energy alternatives like nuclear. Consider their status as powerful players in the European Union, a grouping of 27 nations with a combined population of close to 500 million. The EU emits about 14 per cent of the world’s carbon, ten times as much as Australia, population 20 million.

It’s premature to say we should do nothing. We shouldn’t, however, be rushed into an outcome that is wrong for Australia. And yet a wrong outcome is what we’re about to get. As the media repeats ad nauseam, ‘some type of carbon trading scheme is inevitable’. Every sensible person knows, for reasons alluded to above, that absent a functioning multilateral framework, independent a