That Labor’s return to office would be framed in grandiose terms, as a
watershed shift from social conservatism to progressivism, was easy to
predict. ‘But could this election portend a new progressive era?’, asked
journalist
Andrew West, hopefully.
Predictable perhaps; but also delusional. Certainly, some symbolic
‘firsts’ have cascaded for the benefit of myth-makers: first female
deputy prime minister, first openly gay minister who also happens to be
of Chinese origin, first ministry containing so many women, and
signing-up to Kyoto as a first item of business. The voters who
mattered, though, were moved by more
down-to-earth concerns.
WorkChoices, the cost of living, interest rates and John Howard’s long
time in office were
decisive.
The new government’s own longevity depends on how well they remember
this.
‘The voters who mattered’ were concentrated in those crucial suburban
and regional electorates which changed hands. Once they were solid Labor
supporters. Then they morphed into Howard battlers. Now they’re just
swinging voters who’ll support whichever party appeals to them. They
aren’t so many prodigal sons and daughters returning to their ‘natural’
party. A realignment - or more accurately, a disalignment - did occur in
1996. But it was Paul Keating who fractured Labor’s base. Howard just
did a good job of holding on to a slab for so long.
Thereafter the old Whitlamite strategy was doomed. No stable majority
can be forged by grafting middle class progressives onto a more
conservative working class. In today’s shifting and fragmented
landscape, a government with Whitlamite ambitions would be at serious
risk. Judging by their campaign style, none of this is news to Kevin
Rudd or senior party operatives.
Still, things could go wrong on another level.
Look at how things work in the information society. Across social policy
fronts, networks of institutions, ‘experts’, activists and media
gravitate toward lines of conventional thinking, often progressivist in
tendency. This is underpinned by some long-term trends. Workforce
polarisation between a growing class of knowledge workers and the broad
mass of (blue and white collar) routine workers; socio-economic
disparities between inner-urban and outer-suburban or rural regions; the
pervasive reach and conformism of communications media - these, to name
a few, are narrowing the social sources of our politics.
Acting as gatekeepers, such networks aim to define the limits of
acceptable discourse. Some of the new ministers are from their ranks.
Others will slide into well-established policy tracks, without due
attention to alternatives. All the while, conventional thinking is
liable to clash with sentiment out in the suburbs and regions.
The greatest moral challenge?
Let’s dwell on climate change, which dominated the government’s early
colour and movement. Kevin Rudd likes to call it one of the greatest
moral challenges of our time. He may regret raising the bar so high. In
choosing this style of language, Mr Rudd takes his cue from the
environment movement, which insists on framing the issue in terms of
moral culpability. They never tire of carping about Australia’s high
emissions per capita and ‘inaction’ over the last eleven years. As the
public will come to understand, neither of these mean much. The volume
of our emissions is too small. Nor are most Australians guilt-stricken
about our industrial progress over the last century. Whether or not
global warming is a by-product, industrial capitalism lifted millions
out of poverty in the developed world, and now does so throughout
developing world.
We need not atone for any crime. To start with, Mr Rudd should step off
the moral pedestal and keep it real (as Ali G would say).
To date, high emitting nations have adopted a consistent approach to
climate change, best described as pussyfooting around. The outcome in
Bali was more of the same. None are prepared to inflict real pain on
their peoples for the sake of global warming. The big-talking Europeans
are short of their Kyoto targets, and it’s easier for them than
countries like the US and Australia. Many EU states switched to cleaner
energy sources, like nuclear, decades ago (for reasons unrelated to
climate) and they’re not major energy exporters. The Americans are
entitled to doubt their bona fides. A lot of Europe’s cuts, such
as they are, accrued from dismantling clapped-out industrial plant in
the former eastern bloc. Still, Europeans as a whole are making a meal
of it, and their emissions trading scheme is a joke. As for the British,
while they claim to have met their Kyoto targets, unlike the continent,
a team of Oxford economists led by
Dieter Helm dismisses such
claims as ‘illusory’.
In the meantime, China and India, leading the developing pack, cling to
the UN’s ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ formula, meaning
they plan to take a back seat, however much their rocketing emissions
exceed ours. Stuck on the moral pedestal, they blame the developed
world. Naturally enough, the Americans refuse to play on an uneven field
or pay what amount to green reparations. They are also right to draw a
distinction between developing countries advanced on the path to
industrialisation like China, and others mired in misery like most
African states. Nor can it be assumed that the US position will change
easily after Bush’s term. Even if a Democrat enters the White House, the
next UN protocol needs to get past the senate (where
Republicans have just
issued a strongly greenhouse-sceptical report). And in Bali a core of
other important countries, including Canada, Japan and Russia were
grudging on any kind of targets.
Agitation over climate change resembles a parallel universe. In the
first place, while delegates sweltered in Bali, the European Central
Bank joined the US Federal Reserve in pumping billions of dollars into
the world’s banking system to stave off a downturn in the American
economy (on which world growth depends) and, here, Treasurer Wayne Swan
lambasted port infrastructure constraints impeding coal exports from
Queensland. In the second place, European and Australian delegations in
Bali favoured (only in principle) near-term developed country targets
which would hobble the American economy and put a dent in the
international coal market. The first of these actions happened in the
real world; the second on fantasy island.
It‘s easy to explain this outbreak of foot-dragging. Consider that the
IPCC forecasts global average temperatures rising by a range of 1.8
degrees to 4 degrees over the coming century, and its worst case
scenarios are based on
speculative assumptions
about growth rates and the world’s adaptive capacity. Political leaders
are left weighing up a remotely possible chance of climate cataclysm
against an absolutely certain prospect of damage to their economies.
Make no mistake, the sort of targets pushed by the UN entail economic
pain. Hence the big talking and pussyfooting around. This is also
Australia’s position. As things now stand, the government has deferred
everything until economist Ross Garnaut reports in
June. This was a convenient let-out in Bali. A person of integrity,
Garnaut laid it on the line from the start. The world’s response to
climate change, he says, could end the
‘Platinum Age’ of
accelerated world growth over recent years.
Indeed, repeated claims by the
Climate Institute and
others that we can enact deep cuts - even achieve carbon neutrality -
while barely noticing are nonsense. Worse, they’re a cruel hoax. The
pain will be felt most deeply by blue-collar workers, and other
riff-raff who don’t seem to matter.
Dr Philip DAdams of Monash
University estimates that an emissions trading scheme will cost us 1.3
per cent of GDP by 2030, ‘equivalent to a reduction of around $21.5
billion a year in today’s dollars’. And as reported by Alan Mitchell in
the Australian Financial Review (12 December 2007), former ABARE
director Dr Brian Fisher says Labor’s renewable energy target alone,
aside from anything else, will cost the economy $1.5 billion and 3600
jobs in 2020. Rosy scenarios ignore the danger of sectional dislocation,
even if the aggregate growth outcomes look benign.
Commentator Ross Gittins also wears rose-coloured glasses. He is the
author of Gittinomics, which should have been called ‘gentronomics’,
since it’s about arranging the nation’s affairs to suit inner-suburban
professionals. Gittins opened a
column last June with
this gruff declaration: ‘next time you hear someone advocating some
project or policy change on the grounds that it would create jobs, close
your ears.’ Let them eat cake indeed. Turning recently to
climate change he says,
dismissively, that any cost to GDP won’t be ‘an absolute loss, just an
opportunity cost’. Just an opportunity cost for him, but lost job
opportunities for thousands of working people. There are few better
illustrations of the commentariat’s smug arrogance on this issue.
A worse offender, though, is the Climate Institute, which calls on
Australia to step up as a world ‘leader’ in emissions reductions. While
the Institute
concedes that this
entails lower growth for some industries, they typically fail to
quantify these impacts or express any concern for the losers. Such
adjustments will hurt real people, even if they live beyond the magic
circle.
(The Institute has too much influence for comfort. Labor’s illogical
pairing of a mandatory renewable energy target with carbon trading
appears to have been lifted from
them. According to Alan
Mitchell, Brian Fisher describes this combination as ‘one of the worst
pieces of public policy you can ever imagine’).
Green flacks like the Institute may demand that Australia set the pace.
These shadowy fanatics would happily cut a swathe through some of our
most important industries. But our minuscule share of global emissions -
only 1.4 per cent and set to fall in relative terms even if we do
nothing - ill befits us for an avant garde role. It’s a bit like
expecting Luxembourg to have led the recent EU treaty negotiations.
There’s no reason why we should take the plunge while the world just
dips its toes. Nor should our workers be offered up as guinea pigs. Our
touchstone should be prudent and cautious engagement.
The price ain’t right
Fear-mongering, abetted by political opportunism, however, have now spun
the energy industry into a state of uncertainty and investment
paralysis. In the interests of certainty, prudent and cautious
engagement are about to be tossed aside for early action. We have been
collectively frog-marched down this dubious route. Despite bipartisan
commitment to carbon trading in the form of a
‘cap and trade’ scheme, a
deal of respected opinion is ebbing away from this approach. Some prefer
carbon taxes or hybrid trade-tax schemes, others old-fashioned research
and development subsidies.
Last November, for instance, the venerable Committee for the Economic
Development of Australia (CEDA) published a
collection of papers
which ‘questions the common view that a carbon trading system is better
than alternatives such as a carbon tax or a hybrid scheme.’ The
contributors include world authorities on climate economics from here
and overseas. Similar views have been promoted by Bjorn Lomborg, the
‘sceptical environmentalist’.
When Kyoto’s agenda took off more than a decade ago, the objectives were
to cut energy consumption in absolute terms and induce shifts to cleaner
sources. Carbon trading was thought to achieve both. Time has brought
the first objective into sharper relief, however. As climate change
policy moves from the fringes to the mainstream, concerns about the
implications for growth and living standards have come to the fore.
Hence the surge in scepticism about carbon trading. There is rising
interest in ways to stimulate cleaner technologies without the
accompanying clamp on consumption. Contributors to the CEDA collection
propose different ways to price carbon, but some creative thinkers are
challenging the need for any type of carbon price.
Writing in the Harvard Law and Policy Review, authors
Michael Shellenbergerand Ted Nordhaus, and
others, explain in detail why carbon trading won’t induce the new
technologies we need. They argue instead, putting it simply, that public
investment in clean technologies, on a large enough scale, will trigger
similar investments from the private sector. The carrot of public
investment makes the stick of a carbon price redundant. Not only is this
course more compatible with dynamic growth, they say, but it is saleable
politically.
Power generation produces 36 per cent of Australia’s carbon emissions.
Say we chose to secure our energy industry with a plan combining public
investment in research and development with a phased timetable,
consistent with technological progress, for the retro-fitting or
replacement of old plant and the deployment of new sources. Would this
approach damage our growth prospects less than carbon trading? Would it
have a less dislocating impact on vulnerable workers? We will never
know. The idea won‘t get a hearing. We’re stuck with an agenda conceived
by ponderous UN bureaucrats and green ideologues.
Sleepwalking to carbon trading may turn into a rude awakening if the
shockwaves reverberate through critical suburban and regional
electorates. Then voters will ask why their communities are losing jobs
while higher emitting countries do nothing. They’ll ask why they’re
paying higher power bills, and why the better-off aren’t paying more.
They’ll question what any of this has to do with the world’s climate,
drought and water shortages. Ultimately, they’ll demand to know why
their government colluded in this trahison des verts and sold out
their interests.
Unlike many commentators, ranging from
Alan Ramsey to Imre
Saluszinsky, we don’t think Saturday’s election result is a foregone
conclusion. Even though every poll since Kevin Rudd became Labor leader
has strongly favoured the ALP, a substantial but not unprecedented
last-minute swing to the conservatives, combined with their (grossly
unfair) buffer of about two percentage points (which would get the
Coalition over the line with barely 48 per cent of the
two-party-preferred vote), may still be enough to save Howard’s bacon.
We also don’t subscribe to the view that should Howard lose, it will be
down to voter ennui: that the Government’s economic record over
their 11 years in office would somehow entitle them to feel electorally
hard done by. As we argued in March and
September, the Howard
Government’s economic performance has been patchy and often downright
irresponsible. It has enjoyed and capitalised on considerable good
fortune on two fronts: inheriting an economy that previous Labor
governments had reformed and modernised, and enjoying the fruits of an
unprecedentedly long and strong resources boom.
John Howard came to power in 1996 on the back of voter disenchantment –
much of it in Labor’s traditional heartland – with the Keating
Government’s social and cultural agenda. Howard, like Ronald Reagan
before him, presented himself successfully as the true friend of the
battlers who had been deserted by their ‘natural’ party, and for a while
he lived up to the image. In this he was helped in no small part by the
reluctance of the party he had defeated to face up to the implications
of their defeat (see our colleague
Michael Thompson’s vain
attempt to influence the findings of the Hawke-Wran review in 2002).
However, his last – and probably, though by no means certainly, his
final – three terms have seen him revert to form: a big and reckless
spender in pursuit of social and cultural ends that are in some ways as
much at odds with the mainstream as were Keating’s.
This election campaign has become something of a reprise of 1983, with
Howard as Prime Minister on the same frantic and desperate vote-buying
spree in 2007 as he was as Malcolm Fraser’s Treasurer 25 years ago. In
the past, when challenged privately about this previous chapter, Howard
has responded that Fraser refused to listen to his advice – a claim that
is given some credence in the 2002
memoirs of the tinder-dry
former Federal Liberal MP John Hyde:
‘By the time of the [1982] budget, Howard had
been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position. It had become
apparent to the backbench that fiscal management had been taken out of
his and Treasury’s hands by a Cabinet determined to “buy the election”.
He could have resigned in protest, but if he had removed his voice from
Cabinet, not only would he have been blamed for the forthcoming
inevitable defeat; the budget would have been even worse. My opinion,
which I voiced, was that he should not resign’ (p 206).
However, given Howard’s behaviour this time around, one is entitled to
question the candour of his disavowals, to Hyde and others, of
responsibility for Fraser’s profligacy.
Annabel Crabb quipped
that Rudd’s honest answer to Rove McManus’s staple ‘Who would you turn
gay for?’ question would be Reserve Bank Governor Glenn Stevens. It
sounds right at several levels: (1) Kevin comes across as a bit of a
nerd (not that there’s anything wrong with that); (2) Stevens did what
Costello swore blind wouldn’t happen and raised interest rates in the
middle of an election campaign; (3) Rudd says that he, unlike Howard and
Costello, will take seriously Stevens’s blunt and repeated warnings to
rein in fiscal policy or face the interest rate consequences.
On this last score, Labor’s modest election spending commitments
relative to those of the Coalition (about $10 bn less if tax
expenditures are included, as they should be) are an encouraging sign
that he means it.
It is of course fair to ask, as Howard has done, just what should be
done with the huge Commonwealth budget surpluses that have been racked
up in recent years as a result of the booming economy. There are only
three possibilities: save them, spend them or give them back as tax
cuts. The first is less of an imperative now that Commonwealth debt has
been pretty much retired, and the third – as Stevens and others warn –
risks overheating an economy already operating at or beyond capacity.
This pretty much leaves the second option.
So how to spend the surpluses responsibly and without overstimulating
the economy? The answer lies in a dispassionate analysis of the medium
and long-term challenges we know this country will face.
The immediate and medium-term challenge is persistent skill shortages.
They constrain innovation and business development, and threaten our
industries’ global competitiveness. When the resources boom starts to
peter out, our exposure in world markets will be manifest. We will sink
or swim on the quality of our products and services relative to those of
our fierce competitors.
The Howard Government has neglected education and skills development.
They talk about the additional skills investment they’ve made during
their years in office, but other developed countries have mostly
invested more strongly over the same period (and much of the Howard
Government’s investment has calculatedly avoided the State and Territory
TAFE systems), so we have slipped sharply relative to them. Labor has
committed to
tackling this issue
responsibly, with an investment of $600 million over four years to allow
employers to tender for the training they need through industry skills
councils, resulting in an estimated 450,000 additional training places
that will be concentrated heavily at the higher skill levels, including
an extra 65,000 traditional apprenticeships.
Rudd has also shown himself willing to invest in modernising our school
systems (a sharp contrast with Howard’s preoccupation with winning the
history wars), although we do question the value of
investing in laptops as the key technological driver of improved
educational performance.
The longer team threats arise from our ageing population. Declining
workforce participation and sharply rising social security and health
care costs as the older aged share of the population increases will
impose a huge burden on future wage earners. There are three things we
should be, but under Howard mostly haven’t been, doing now in
anticipation of this challenge:
1. modernising our health care system, with particular emphasis on
preventative and community care (as distinct from hospitals)
2. building workforce skills to offset the dampening effect on growth of
falling participation (and indeed to some extent slowing the decline in
participation itself – the higher a person’s skill level, the more
likely they are to join and remain in the workforce)
3. increasing the compulsory superannuation rate from the 9 per cent it
has been throughout Howard’s term of office to something like the 15 per
cent rate that is necessary to enable the typical worker to fund their
own retirement.
The world is dismissively critical of other countries – notably some
oil-rich states – that squander their windfall wealth on gross (and
usually highly skewed) consumption without a thought for the future.
Australia today is to some extent in this position – we should be
investing much more responsibly.
Kevin Rudd, if he wins on Saturday, will command enormous authority in
the Labor caucus. He has already flagged that he, not caucus and the
factions, will have the final say over the composition of his ministry,
and in this we applaud him. We have every confidence that, certainly in
his first term, he will have little difficulty staring down the
spendthrift and social engineering elements in caucus.
A defeated Coalition will confront major problems – at least as severe
as Labor has faced in the post-1996 years. The senior conservative
office holder in this country will be (at least for a time) the Lord
Mayor of Brisbane. The party will have been rebuffed for failing its
self-styled key criterion for holding office: its status as the better
and more trusted economic managers. And its second-most electorally
successful leader ever will be remembered as the man who didn’t know
when to let go; whose legacy will be pored over and picked apart for a
few months, then all but forgotten. Hubris often exacts a terrible cost,
in life as in the ancient tragedies.
Skills and collaboration, not WorkChoices, deliver economic success
If we weren’t the first to say it, we were certainly quick off the mark.
In our March 2007 editorial, we said that
compared to the prime years of economic reform and responsibility under
Bob Hawke and Paul Keating in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Howard
Government’s economic record has been patchy at best.
We also said the ALP should not shy away from a campaign fight on
economic management – first because it wouldn’t work (the electorate
would quickly sense Labor’s discomfort and penalise them for it); second
and more importantly because the courage and imagination Hawke Labor
displayed in a much more difficult economic environment than Howard ever
faced represents a positive message to put before the electorate.
Since then, we’ve been treated to Peter Costello’s damning assessment,
in the Errington-van Onselen biography published in July, of John Howard
as Malcolm Fraser’s Treasurer (‘had not been a great reformer’; ‘not a
success in terms of interest rates and inflation’) and as a profligate
spender in election campaigns (‘I have to foot the bill and that worries
me, and then I start thinking about not just footing the bill today, but
if we keep building in all these things, footing the bill in 5 and 10
and 15 years, and you know, I do worry about the sustainability of these
things’).
In this light, you have to wonder what Costello privately thinks about
Howard’s latest round of populism and pork-barrelling:
1. bailing out the Mersey Hospital in Tasmania – ‘a disaster’ that
‘should be closed’, according to the honest if indiscreet Tasmanian
Liberal Senator Stephen Parry; ‘almost certain … to result in the death
of north-west Tasmanians’ because it will ‘cement in place a system in
which adverse events will flourish’, according to
Professor Jeff Richardson,
who chaired the expert advisory group on hospitals in Tasmania
2. offering to fund plebiscites in minuscule, grossly uneconomic
Queensland local government areas threatened with amalgamation.
Both these decisions send the message to State premiers that correct and
courageous decisions to address entrenched problems, based on sound
technical and financial advice, carry too high a political price. This,
mind you, from a prime minister who never tires of berating the Labor
premiers for their ‘wastefulness’.
The most recent development in this regard has been the change of
political tune at The Australian. In a startling
editorial on 30 August,
they stated that ‘set against the microeconomic reforms of the Hawke and
Keating Labor Governments during the 1980s and ’90s, the Howard reform
legacy is thin … The great legacy of the Hawke and Keating years was the
conditions it set for sustained productivity growth. Labor has pledged
to refocus on productivity growth if it wins office. Against this, there
is little to indicate that Mr Howard and the Treasurer have used their
time in office to set the country up for the decades ahead ... [The
Howard Government] has been content to consume the fruits of the present
economic boom and take the luxury of the soft option.’
The ALP has made up some ground on the Coalition in the poll question of
which party would better manage the economy, although they still lag by
between 10 and 20 points. There are good grounds for thinking that if
the gap persists to election day, it may cost them victory.
This is
perhaps the most compelling reason for Labor to campaign from the front
on economic management. It becomes doubly important to ensure that
shadow ministers and candidates – especially but not exclusively those
on the Left – are given no leeway to present off-key messages about, for
example, the need for expensive social programs to redress areas of
neglect and injustice.
The biggest threat to the longevity of a Rudd Labor government comes
from the likely post-election triumphalism that is already emerging in
anticipation of a sweeping Labor victory among elements of the Left and
the greens. Several commentators, including Phillip Adams, Hugh Mackay
and The Age’s Catherine Deveny, see the coming poll as the electorate
turning their backs on Howard for his ‘wedging’, authoritarianism and
dishonesty. They’re licking their lips in anticipation of his
humiliation.
But as
Imre Salusinszky
pointedly asks, where’s the evidence that the Left’s cultural warriors,
who have been crying in the wilderness for 11 years, now suddenly have
the ear of the voter?
The danger is that these elements will gain sway in the corridors of
power – that hard Left and inexperienced ministers, egged on by their
advisers inside and beyond parliament, will pursue agendas that are
socially and culturally at odds with the views of mainstream voters, and
will chip away at the macroeconomic responsibility that Rudd continues
to display.
We saw it in 1993 – though on that occasion it was Prime
Minister Keating himself who led the triumphalist band – with
catastrophic results for Labor three years down the track.
Fortunately Rudd seems to understand this danger all too well. He told
Salusinszky several months ago that he thinks voters support him because
they grew tired of the Howard Government some time back, but wouldn’t
support in sufficient numbers either Beazley (seen as too soft) or
Latham (too volatile), whereas they see him as ‘every bit as
conservative, temperamentally cautious and safe-handed as Howard’.
There’s no joy there for those on the Left who are eagerly anticipating
a reprise of 1972.
We also said in March that WorkChoices can be presented as a detriment
not just to fairness, but also to our economic future. The Government
and its business allies are engaged in concerted advertising campaigns
that are as dishonest (the business campaign, which slyly knocks over a
straw man) as they are outrageous (how dare the government make us foot
the bill for such blatantly partisan propaganda).
It’s hard to know
whether the advertisements are working as intended – some think they’re
turning the industrial relations issue around, others that they’re just
drawing attention to the elephant in the room (why all the fuss if
there’s nothing to worry about).
In fact there’s now not much difference between the parties on
industrial relations as
Ross Gittins, for one,
points out. In a nutshell, the ALP wants to trade off a little
flexibility for a bit more fairness. The differences between the parties
boil down to these:
1. Labor would abolish (over five years, for those earning under
$100,000) Australian Workplace Agreements and restore collective
bargaining, with or without unions, for those who choose it
2. Labor would reinstate substantially watered-down unfair dismissal
provisions for employees of small businesses
3. Labor would restore a modified award system as the basic safety net,
against which all agreements (except for those earning more than
$100,000) would be tested for fairness – however, the awards would be
constrained to cover just 10 ‘allowable matters’.
Three points need to be made about these differences.
First, they bear
almost no resemblance to the nightmare scenario portrayed in the
deceitful business advertising campaign. Contrary to the picture
presented of burly union thugs storming into hapless small businesses
and shutting them down, union officials are and will continue under a Labor government to be ‘legally required to have a permit and must give
notice of their intention to enter business premises, must have valid
reasons for entering, and an employer may impose conditions on how they
carry out a visit’ (Colin
Fenwick, director of Melbourne University’s Centre for
Employment and Labour Relations Law).
As for the alleged costs of ‘scrapping workplace reform’ documented in
the EconTech report
commissioned by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry for the
campaign, these are derived from a model into which ‘so-called facts’
have been fed that ‘have absolutely nothing to do with the ALP’s
industrial relations policy’ (Colin Fenwick again).
The second point is that – yes, it’s true – Labor’s modest industrial
relations reforms will come at an (even more modest) price. Other things
being equal, businesses will hire more workers if they are allowed to
sack them on a whim, and (particularly during economic downturns) if
they are given leeway to cajole, intimidate or con workers out of
hard-won entitlements in return for inadequate offsetting pay increases.
It’s an old argument: where’s the ideal balance between fairness and
flexibility; between giving relatively powerless individuals collective
rights and giving business a free hand to thrive.
The balance we reached before the introduction of WorkChoices was in
fact far closer to the United States end of the developed countries
spectrum than the Western European end. There’s substance to the charge
that Howard wants to push us right to – indeed, as far as bargaining
rights are concerned, beyond – the US extreme.
The final point to make is that WorkChoices, in its philosophy, its
message and its impact, works directly counter to the other, far more
pressing, industrial imperative: to build the workplace skills that are
critical to this country’s long-term economic competitiveness. Roughly
speaking, 80 per cent of Australian jobs have a clearly defined
educational and skills pathway (tertiary or vocational), but below 50
per cent of workers have the qualifications and/or recognised skills
that attach to these jobs.
We muddle through at present – as we have for
decades – but the skills gap (one manifestation of which is widespread
skill shortages) will continue to widen, particularly under the impact
of the ageing population and falling labour force participation rate.
In time – particularly when the current resources boom peters out –
we’ll find ourselves scarcely able to compete in the global marketplace
unless we’ve quite radically transformed our skill formation patterns.
Unions can and should be a vital partner in this process. (As we noted
in March, Australia’s robust apprenticeship system owes everything to
the past strength of our unions.) They are critical to encouraging
workers, particularly blue-collar workers, to participate in training
and skills development, and to reassuring those who understandably find
this threatening. They can and will ensure that collective agreements
adequately provide for, and appropriately recognise and reward, skills
acquisition.
Workers themselves need the reassurance that their employer values them
sufficiently to make skills acquisition a desirable option. Small
business overall lags sharply behind large and medium firms in its
investment in and commitment to training – this discrepancy largely
accounts for Australia’s generally poor skills profile. It is essential
that we restore the element of partnership between business, workers and
unions that was so carefully built up during the Hawke years.
Important research in the neurosciences shows that people (indeed,
animals generally) fail to learn when they are under stress, anxious
and unhappy. John Merson, a senior lecturer in the School of Science and
Technology Studies at UNSW, argues that this probably goes a long way to
explaining why low socioeconomic status correlates so closely with
inferior learning outcomes – it’s not just poverty per se; the
anxiety and unhappiness that poverty engenders are as much to blame.
Merson
draws several lessons from this research, one of which – that ‘the
“right” balance is needed in students’ emotional as well as cognitive
load’– is especially relevant in this context. ‘Optimum engagement with
learning’, he writes, ‘lies in that zone where the challenge is
demanding enough to be enticing, but not so great as to be daunting’.
This goes to the heart of the question as to what sort of workplace we
need to meet the skills challenge. An insecure, antagonistic workplace
that pits people against each other and individually against a much
better armed boss, where work is a tedious routine and two-way loyalty
is passé, is the very antithesis of what is needed.
If
housing depends on a vision for our cities, try ‘opportunity urbanism’
Suburbia: reports of its death are greatly exaggerated
A much quoted assertion in the housing debate came from
Rory Robertson, financial
analyst at Macquarie Bank. ‘There’s this never satisfying compromise
between proximity, being close to the action’, said Robertson, ‘and the
size of houses and yards and as our cities get bigger, literally,
there’s less room for everyone to be living in nice houses with big
yards’.
Presumably, by ‘bigger’ Robertson means more populous. Hence population
growth, according to his formula, plus wanting to be ‘close to the
action’, equal the end of home ownership for the masses.
Australians have again been subjected to a round of claims and
counter-claims about housing affordability. The issue is now deeply
entangled in a pre-election web of partisan and federal-state rivalries.
Clearly, the contenders are partial to one economic doctrine or another,
but they also bring clashing assumptions, if not to say prejudices,
about how cities work.
A champion of the ‘land-supply-is-irrelevant’ school, Robertson
expresses a timeworn, monocentric conception of urban development. He
imagines a single core ‘close to the action’. There is little sign he
fully understands how fast this pattern is fading away. Writing that
‘what most of us aspire to is better-located homes - homes that are
closer to the centre of the city‘,
Ross Gittins, the
SydneyMorning Herald’s economics editor, is stuck in the
same time warp.
Like many others, Robertson and Gittins lurch from the incomplete
premise that inner suburbs are attractive to home buyers, to the flawed
conclusion that most are choosing medium to high density living or
renting over low density ownership. The initial question, though, isn’t
where buyers want to live, but how. Analysts and commentators, mostly
well-paid professionals, presume too much about consumer preferences.
Surveys and historical experience confirm that most Australians aspire
to own single family, detached dwellings on sizable blocks. This
majority may be defined by parameters like age, family size and
employment status.
Only then comes the question of where buyers want to live. In an ideal
world without constraints, purchasers would opt for upmarket,
well-serviced localities close to established infrastructure. In the
real world, this is beyond their reach - at least in most cases. It
doesn’t follow, however, that they are content to rent, or settle for
high density units or town houses. They will pursue their preference to
the periphery - especially low and middle income earners - providing,
and this is the crucial condition, price levels justify the trade-off.
This brings us to the current state of the market. The likes of
Robertson and Gittins assume prices won’t ever warrant the trade-off.
They cite the case of outer western Sydney, where developers are
struggling to attract buyers though values have been sliding since 2004.
At the same time, inner suburban prices are stable or rising.
The crucial point, however, is that outer suburban prices have declined
from historically high peaks (also high by world standards, as the Demographia survey
makes plain). And prices remain unpalatable to borrowers, especially in
a phase of escalating interest rates. New houses are still coming onto
the market for at least $350,000 in western Sydney. That’s too high for
low and middle income earners. Why are prices unacceptable when the
market is so weak? If there is ‘no demand’, as the NSW Government puts
it, why haven’t prices collapsed? Why haven’t supply and demand produced
an equilibrium price? These are the great unasked questions.
The answer, of course, is that zoning regulations, resulting in
artificial scarcity, state and local government charges, and developer
on-costs have placed a floor under prices. According to
Alan Moran of the
Institute of Public Affairs, Sydney zoning controls invest greenfields
lots with a value of around $115,000, while charges come to $122,000 and
development on-costs range from $40,000 to $60,000. The Housing Industry
Association’s estimates are comparable.
These claims are contested by the NSW Government. Nevertheless, there is
a compelling case for review, not just of the amounts estimated, but,
more importantly, of the planning philosophy behind them. It’s true that
housing is different from many other products. Supply comes to the
market on certain conditions. Lots must be connected to roads,
electricity, water mains and sewerage. But current zoning restrictions,
charges and on-costs go far beyond these essential amenities.
Over recent decades, the field of town planning has embraced a
distinctly paternal agenda. According to this worldview, the traditional
suburb was a wasteland of social isolation, alienation and dysfunction,
not to mention sheer ugliness. For a variety of reasons, state
governments have, on the whole, bought this line. Forget that it doesn’t
match the experience of millions who flocked to suburbia during the
post-war era. Residential development must only proceed, according to
the planners, on sites enveloped by a full-blown network of
infrastructure and services.
Any responsible government will aim for equal access to social services
over time. But there is another powerful consideration. Is access to
full-blown infrastructure and services compatible with general home
ownership? Is it reasonable for governments (state and local) to say the
public can have home ownership with the full suite of infrastructure and
services or not at all?
Debate is raging on whether developers and buyers or consolidated
revenue should cough up for these expenditures. There is a more basic
objection, however. When charges and on-costs are earmarked for
discretionary priorities like ‘community facilities’, libraries,
swimming pools, playgrounds, child care centres, public transport and
certain energy and water saving devices, government is pre-empting
lifestyle decisions that rightly belong to home buyers themselves. It’s
also foreclosing on a trade-off between superior amenities and the
prospect of home ownership.
People should be free to make their own choices.
‘Engines of upward social mobility’
Our housing affordability crisis emerges from the debris of a failed
planning ideology, embodied in the term ‘environmental, social and
economic sustainability’. This common, if nebulous, phrase denotes a
seamless garment of mutually reinforcing wisdom. In practise
‘environmental sustainability’, as conceived by most environmentalists
and planners, is far from compatible with social and economic
sustainability (whatever that may mean).
The economic success of our cities rests on different foundations than
it did two decades ago. Aside from the special case of zones directly
plugged into the global economy, like the concentration of advanced
business services and high-tech innovation known as Sydney’s ‘global arc
corridor’, economic vibrancy is associated with geographical dispersion.
The impact of globalisation on regulation, taxes, and the growth of the
services economy, together with modern communications and transport
systems, have liberated businesses. Today economic opportunity is more
often a function of mobility, abundant cheap land and population growth.
Urban theorists have long discussed
‘globalisation and the rise of
city-regions’. According to this line of thought, ‘a
world-wide mosaic of large city-regions seems to be overriding an
earlier core-periphery system of spatial organization’. The world’s
growth cities display polycentric and decentralised patterns of
commercial development and residential settlement. Recent commentary in
Forbes Magazine
pointed out that the fastest growing localities in the United States,
recorded in the latest census, were suburbs of sun-belt cities like
Sacramento, Phoenix and Dallas-Fort Worth, where ‘geographic growth is
almost completely unregulated’.
Examining another booming sun-belt city, Houston, urbanist Joel Kotkin
proposes a theoretical perspective he calls
‘opportunity urbanism’.
‘Opportunity cities’, he explains, ‘generate economic opportunity across
the entire income spectrum, for all racial and ethnic groups, and across
all education levels’. The crucial ingredients are job growth and basic
affordability, especially housing affordability. ‘In contrast, as other
communities become built-out and reach their development boundaries, the
lack of available land constrains their ability to provide new,
reasonably-priced housing options’.
The notion of an urban core ‘where the action is’, as Robertson puts it,
is misconceived. ‘During the last half-century’, writes Kotkin,
‘telecommunications and transportation revolutions have made it possible
for [major corporations] to locate themselves away from traditional
business centres’. Increasingly, this trend is observable across our
major cities.
Earlier this year the Australian Financial Review reported that
‘average office rents in the nation’s suburban office precincts rose 8.4
per cent last year’, and recently ran a report of ‘32 office buildings
changing hands in the Sydney suburban market during the financial year
at prices in excess of $5 million - a total turnover of $900 million’.
Last month the country’s largest general insurer, Insurance Australia
Group, announced plans to relocate a number of divisions from Sydney CBD
to Parramatta.
Contrary to the myth of desolate, dormitory suburbs, reached by tedious
commutes from a distant city centre, more outer suburban residents are
working closer to home. Kotkin points out that
…for most residents of newer cities, such as
Houston, the automobile will remain the prevailing means of transit. One
explanation is that most jobs are not clustered around a rail line or
bus route, but rather are scattered throughout a metro area. This makes
the kind of point-to-point travel offered by the automobile particularly
helpful.
These dispersive trends have accelerated during recent years, leading to
the phenomenon that The Brookings Institution’s Rob Lang has called
“edgeless cities”, where employment becomes more spread out and less
accessible to traditional mass transit.
Contemporary fringe suburbs are more diverse, both socially and
economically, than their counterparts of the early post-war era. This is
as much a function of economic trends as of planning measures, if not
more so. And residential development is vital to their prosperity, along
with spin-off industries.
Reporting on the downturn in Sydney’s growth over 2006,
William Mitchell andAnthea Bill of Newcastle
University stress that ‘the housing boom stimulates economic activity as
households renovate and expand their consumption of household items (as
they feel wealthier)…Then as the housing market slows the broader
activity associated with it (construction, retailing, finance and
insurance, manufacturing, etc) also slackens’. Just as resources are
driving the northern and western states, residential development is
integral to the whole south-east Australian region. In this economy,
restrictive planning can generate ripples of social distress.
Inevitably, planners will retort that opportunity urbanism just isn’t
environmentally sustainable. Some will misapply the concept of
‘ecological footprint’, the amount of land area required to sustain a
particular lifestyle. It is often said, for instance, that Sydney’s
footprint is equivalent to forty-nine per cent of New South Wales. Yet
this shibboleth has been
slammed, as it wrongly
assumes a portion of land can only be used for one purpose at a time.
Others claim suburban growth will send carbon emissions soaring. In a
field where pseudo-scientific notions jostle for attention, ‘ecological
footprint’ has lost ground to ‘carbon footprint’. Bear in mind that
Australia produces only 1.5 per cent of global emissions. Also consider
that
Patrick Troy and Bill Randolph
of the City Futures Research Centre found ‘tenants and those in flats
are in less control of their immediate accommodation and have much less
capacity to effect a meaningful transition to lower energy use’. Little
wonder that according to the
Australian Conservation Foundation’s
consumption atlas, ‘people living in Australia’s wealthiest inner-city
suburbs are responsible for more than double the amount of greenhouse
pollution than households in less affluent areas’, such as low density
fringe suburbs.
None of this will detach planners from their dreams of compact
European-style cities.
Elite objections aside, however, most Australians will agree there are
lessons from the success stories of the American sun-belt, considering
similarities in climate, population densities, land resources, values
and lifestyles. After all, Australians too have cherished their cities,
in Kotkin’s resonant phrase, as ‘engines of upward social mobility’.
Value judgements, conflicting
assumptions undermine Climate Institute ‘research’
On 28 May, ABC radio
bulletins were abuzz with news of new research ‘showing power costs
would rise less if the Government moved quickly to bring in a mix of
measures, including emissions trading, than if it waited’.
The source of that research was not a university, research institution,
industry association or government agency, but rather a ‘greenhouse
lobby group’, as the ABC called it – the
Climate Institute of
Australia (CI). As a rule, the ABC isn’t in the business of
promoting lobby groups. Why then was this research accorded such
prominent coverage and presented as self-evidently true?
The habit of media outlets, particularly at the progressive end of the
spectrum, to confer authoritative status on green lobbies is a fact of
modern life. The point is made well by former British MP Dick Taverne in
The March ofUnreason:
Just as parties are a necessary part of
democracy, environmental lobbies play an important part in making people
and governments aware of environmental issues. But blind loyalty to the
cause is just as corrupting as tribalism in party politics. In fact it
is more dangerous, because the media subject the pronouncements of
parties to ruthless criticism, but treat environmental groups like The
Soil Association, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth as independent
authorities above criticism, as if they were a sort of collective Mother
Theresa. There is a general feeling that since they are trying to save
the planet, they must be right.
To those groups mentioned by Taverne, add CI.
Journalists would deny that their positive coverage of CI’s output is
driven by shared ideological assumptions about climate change, if not
the world at large. They would argue that it is more to do with the
organisation’s independence.
According to a
press release, CI was founded in 2005 ‘through a $10 million grant
from the philanthropic group, the Poola Foundation’. One of CI’s
directors, Mark Wootton, is also a director of Poola, which distributes
the bequest of the late Tom Kantor, the brother of Mr Wootton’s wife
Eve. The foundation disburses most of its money to environmental
projects.
Another of CI’s directors is Clive Hamilton, better known as Executive
Director of the Australia Institute,
a progressive think tank. The Australia Institute is also funded by
Poola. Hamilton is the author of numerous books and articles on the
theme that material affluence is incompatible with wellbeing. CI
represents an extension of Hamilton’s obsessions, since global warming
is seen as the most serious of many negative by-products of the market
economy.
For many observers, CI’s funding by a philanthropic trust attests to the
integrity and impartiality of its work. In contrast, researchers funded
by commercial concerns are routinely accused of bowing to their
paymasters. This tactic is rife when it comes to debates about climate
change. There is a knee-jerk tendency to dismiss anyone who questions
the IPCC-Kyoto-Stern orthodoxy as being in the pay of some sinister
interest.
Yet it may be reasonably argued that the type of grant made in this
case, an up-front single capital sum, will inevitably confine CI’s field
of vision to enquiries which happen to justify the grant’s purposes.
These include ‘raising public awareness and debate about the dangers to
Australia of global warming and to motivate the country to take positive
action’. As we will see, this results in a tendency to fish around for
worst-case scenarios.
A hermetically sealed trust like Poola isn’t subject to commercial or
political pressures. Nor is it instinctively sensitive to the day-to-day
reality of people who may be damaged by its purist agenda.
Nonetheless, it is rarely productive to prejudge the quality of research
into the implications of global warming (or anything else for that
matter) on the basis of who funds it. The public interest will only be
served if all research, whatever the source, is examined on its merits.
Faking the switch
The CI paper that attracted so much attention on 28 May was
Making the
Switch: Australian Clean Energy Policies. The underlying
assumptions and modelling methodologies are contained in a
supplementary report by McLennan Magasanik Associates, ‘one of
Australia’s leading electricity sector modellers’.
The principal paper’s headline story, the one that so interested the
ABC, assumes a scenario in which the government introduces emissions
trading with a ‘soft’ carbon price of $10 a tonne in 2012 and delays
‘full emissions trading’ until 2020. This is called the ‘wait and see’
scenario. If this comes to pass, says the paper, we will have
electricity ‘prices around 20 per cent higher in the 2020s, 60 per cent
higher in the 2030s and 90 per cent higher in the 2040s’.
‘This rapid price increase’, it is explained, ‘risks significant shocks
to the industry and wider economy.’
CI urges the government to go for a ‘mix of policies’ option: full
carbon pricing as of 2010, clean energy targets and comprehensive energy
efficiency. ‘A mix of policies reduces carbon price increases by around
a third and electricity price increase by around 20 per cent over the
first two decades of action [sic]’. The precise meaning of this sentence
(and many others) isn’t so clear. Apparently, prices would be 20 per
cent lower than the ‘wait and see’ scenario outcome.
(ABC newsrooms wouldn’t have appreciated that this isn’t such a dramatic
improvement, considering that CI forecasts prices rising by as much as
90 per cent in the 2040s under the wicked ‘wait and see’ scenario.)
As noted above, these findings were reported as pressing and
self-evident. Closer examination reveals that the paper is built on a
collection of gratuitous value judgments and conflicting or arbitrary
assumptions.
Gratuitous value judgements
Making the Switch starts with a familiar premise: ‘No other
conclusion can be drawn from the scientific assessments of Australia’s,
and the world’s, premier scientific institutions that countries like
Australia will need to reduce emissions by 60 to 90 per cent by 2050
[sic]’.
Some researchers and a few national and international agencies have
estimated that global emissions need to be reduced by around half from
1990 levels if atmospheric carbon is to be stabilised at safe levels.
This is not to say, however, that there are scientific grounds to
suggest Australia ‘will need to’ do so. There are no scientific grounds
for Australia to do anything. Extinguishing our 1.4 per cent
contribution to global emissions will scarcely affect the world’s
climate systems. If CI believes there are other grounds for Australia to
act, they are not spelt out in the paper. The need to act now is
asserted as obvious.
CI, like other green groups, insists the debate on whether Australia
should take early action to cut emissions is over. The subject is far
from closed, however. Considering our minuscule share of global
emissions, and the severe impact such action would have on our fossil
fuel dependent, energy exporting economy, the issue ought to be
subjected to continuing scrutiny. A model approach is found in the
Productivity Commission’s
submission to the prime minister’s task group on emissions trading,
which contains critical examination of various rationales for early
action like avoiding climate change, meeting the Kyoto target, being a
good world ‘citizen’ and influencing others, reducing investment
uncertainty, and facilitating the transition to a lower emissions
economy.
In contrast, CI prefers to indulge in gratuitous value judgments.
‘It is inevitable’, says the paper, ‘there will be winners and losers in
the transition to a low carbon economy …’ CI, unlike other green
lobbies, concedes that ‘certain greenhouse intensive trade exposed
industries such as aluminium production and iron and steel may suffer
disproportionate impacts from domestic carbon pricing’. But CI claims
the right to decide that some industries deserve to flourish at the
expense of others, without any consideration of alternative policy
frameworks. The prospect of losers ‘should not be an excuse for inaction
across the wider economy’, it says.
CI is cold on nuclear energy because, amongst other things, of ‘public
opposition’. On the other hand, public opposition to the closure of
power stations or steel and aluminium plants doesn’t rate.
Conflicting assumptions
The modelling behind CI’s benign ‘mix of policies’ assumes there will be
emissions trading as of 2010 and a concurrent, if transitional, clean
energy target (CET) scheme. This flies in the face of most other
commentary on emissions trading.
The paper explains that CET is a market-based mechanism that ‘operates
like the Government’s Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) through
tradable permits to drive the lowest cost technologies to market’.
However, national emissions trading is advocated by many, including the
Commonwealth Treasury, precisely because a single all-embracing scheme
will eliminate economic distortions produced by piecemeal state and
federal abatement measures like MRET. The paper itself says an important
purpose of carbon pricing is to ‘create a level playing field for
business and consumers’. That message is delivered by several
submissions to the PM’s task group, as well as their final report.
Neither Making the Switch nor the supplementary report, however,
comments on the potential for emissions trading and CET to cancel each
other out. Nor do they attempt to quantify this possibility. Perhaps CI
is just ideologically committed to renewable energy and doesn’t trust
the market forces generated by emissions trading.
At any rate, this represents a significant rupture in the logic of CI’s
argument.
Arbitrary assumptions
As noted, the ‘wait and see’ horror story assumes the government will
impose a ‘soft’ carbon price of $10 a tonne from 2012 to 2020 and aim to
reduce emissions by 80 per cent from 1990 levels by 2050. The paper was
timed to pre-empt the PM’s task group’s final report, and these figures
reflect speculation about the report’s recommendations. In the event,
the task group didn’t specify a carbon price or target, so CI’s exercise
is purely hypothetical. It can be consigned to the category of political
tactics rather than economic analysis.
(This may explain another gaping hole in the paper – at no stage does it
nominate the appropriate carbon price for ‘full’ emissions trading.)
Nevertheless, it is striking that CI chose the high emissions reduction
target of 80 per cent. This served to deliver the alarming figures, but
positions CI way out on a limb. Almost everyone else, including the IPCC,
Stern, the G8 and Labor, talk about 50 or 60 per cent.
Clearly, CI wants to exert maximum pressure on the government to take
strong action now. Perhaps it fears the heat will go out of the issue
if, over time, adverse climate predictions are modified or if giant
emitters such as the US, the EU and China take matters in hand and let
bit players like Australia off the hook. Stressing the need for urgent
measures, the paper asserts ‘the costs of inaction through climate
change are expected to far outweigh the costs of action’. The sentence
bears a footnote to Sir Nicholas Stern's Review.
True to form, however, there is no attempt to balance the discussion by
acknowledging the criticisms of Stern’s methodology. A cash sum will be
worth less at some future date than it is now. In finance and economics,
the discount rate is a percentage by which the current value is reduced
to reflect that future lower value. Stern used a low ‘social’ discount
rate of 0.1 per cent per year (virtually zero), so that any future costs
of climate change emerge as more significant today in financial terms
than if he used a higher (and arguably more realistic) discount rate.
Stern’s approach supports the contention that we should bear the costs
of abatement action now rather than later. But he has many detractors.
WilliamD Nordhaus,
Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, a foremost expert on
the economics of climate change, is but one of those who have
questionedStern’s arbitrary choice of discount rate.
Therein lies a lesson for media outfits like the ABC. Early action is
particularly unwise when ascribing authority to green lobbies like the
Climate Institute.
‘Not all jobs are good’, says former Liberal Party leader John Hewson.
That assertion, odd for an economist, fell from Hewson’s recent
AustralianFinancial Review column lashing the Government and
Labor for appeasing the coal industry over climate change. Neither, he
says, will confront the ‘necessary transition’ to an economy without
coal mining. ‘Some of those jobs, indeed some of those industries’,
writes Hewson, ‘may not be able to be protected, nor should they be’.
More than anything, Hewson’s column encapsulates an important truth
about our climate change debates – there is no absolute response;
rather, it depends on your socio-economic standpoint.
Over recent decades university graduates engaged in professional or
quasi-professional ‘knowledge work’ have grown from a small fraction to
over 30 per cent of the workforce. Since this echelon controls the
channels of ideas and information, it is hardly surprising that we are
bombarded with policy prescriptions that promote, or protect, their
interests at the expense of other socio-economic strata. The
gentrification of social policy is a prominent feature of contemporary
politics. John Howard, ‘the battler’s friend’ is not immune to it. The
trend is apparent on issues like ‘work-life balance’,
‘diversity’, urban development, higher education and, last but not
least, the environment, especially climate change.
When Hewson says some jobs aren’t good, he’s not thinking of his own.
And nor does the whole herd of alarmists bellowing for an end to coal
mining.
It’s fashionable to assert that ‘transition’ to a decarbonised
economy will be relatively painless. Those peddling this myth tend to
draw on a series of undigested, and often misunderstood, research papers
and reports, starting with last year’s Allen Consulting
effort for the Business Council’s Roundtable on Climate Change.
According to the report, greenhouse gas emissions cuts of 60 per cent
from year 2000 levels by 2050 would only reduce GDP by 6 per cent less
than otherwise. Then came the famous - or infamous, depending on your
perspective - Stern Review estimate that ‘the expected annual cost
of emissions reductions consistent with a trajectory leading to
stabilisation … is likely to be around 1 % of GDP by 2050’. The figure
of one per cent was widely described as a sinch. Now, the third
instalment of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, released at the
recent Bangkok conference, follows in a similar vein, stating that
reducing emissions to acceptable levels will cost no more than 3 per
cent of global GDP by 2030.
(The IPCC report brought on the inevitable Sydney Morning Herald
headline: ‘It won’t cost the earth to save the planet’.)
Such pronouncements are commonly used to dismiss the understandable
fears of energy sector investors and unions. One egregious case is the
AFR’s Brian Toohey, who claims ‘Australian households and
businesses will barely notice the cost of achieving deep cuts to
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050’, and adds ‘we could adopt the 80 per
cent target set by California’s Republican Governor, Arnold
Schwarzenegger, and still find it a breeze to achieve’.
A breeze to achieve? Toohey writes from his own secure perspective. What
for him is a breeze, may well be a tornado for thousands of blue-collar
families. While progressives call for drastic measures to save our
common inheritance, there won’t be common consequences - some will win,
others will lose.
In his book What it means to be a Libertarian, American writer
Charles Murray addresses this subject of skewed perspectives with
admirable clarity. ‘Most environmental measures represent class
interests in disguise’, he explains, ‘and involve no public goods worthy
of the name’. Writes Murray:
A thought experiment will illustrate what I
mean by class interests. Imagine a Congress of the United States that is
composed entirely of blue-collar workers and farmers …They identify with
blue-collar neighbourhoods, blue-collar incomes, and blue-collar
recreations. The rest of this Congress are farmers who know the
environment not as an abstraction or an ideal but as a day-to-day
reality of their working lives. Let us imagine this new Congress as it
turns to the latest proposals for environmental law….
Who is right? The Congress we have now or the Congress of blue-collar
workers and farmers? Neither. Many of the currently fashionable
environmental positions are arbitrary, and the different rules set by a
Congress of blue-collar workers and farmers would be equally arbitrary.
Obviously, some people will suffer dislocation from Kyotoesque emissions
cuts, notably workers employed in fossil fuel related industries. On the
other hand, most middle class professionals will emerge unscathed or
benefit from the process.
Aggregate figures don’t tell the real story. First, there is no
unanimity that the impact on GDP growth over time will be negligible.
Last year the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE)
published a much overlooked
paper on the economic impacts of climate change policy. The bureau
estimated that if we met the Kyoto targets, GDP in 2050 will be 10.7 per
cent lower than otherwise. That’s not so trivial. And some environmental
economists have come out against Stern’s conclusions, Professors
William
Nordhaus of Yale and
Sir
Partha Dasgupta of Cambridge to name just two.
Second, aggregates, national or global, say nothing about the
distribution of employment growth over time. Under the hammer of carbon
abatement measures, some industry sectors will decline or disappear,
while others will expand. In the same paper, ABARE estimated that if we
took independent climate action, even in conjunction with global action,
by 2050 our coal and ‘non ferrous metal’ industries (measured by output)
will be respectively 32 per cent and 75 per cent smaller than otherwise.
In contrast ‘services’, where most of our loud-mouth greenies are found,
will only be 6 per cent smaller. Few displaced workers will manage the
transition to expanding sectors.
That’s something you won’t hear from the assortment of ‘shut-the-mines’
zealots, including the Greens, Greenpeace, the Wilderness Society and
the Nature Conservation Council, who assembled in Sydney for a coal
crisis
summit on 30 April.
It won’t be a ‘breeze’ at all. Our green-tinged middle class can afford
to push the whole panoply of Kyotoesque measures like carbon taxes,
emissions trading and renewable energy development. As Murray suggests,
however, their choices are ‘arbitrary’. There are alternative
perspectives.
The starting point, of course, is that domestic action will have no
impact on global climate realities. Our population is too small. The
coal question, though, has a particular twist. Hardline greens contend
that, as a major coal exporter, we are morally culpable for the carbon
emitted by end users.
This can only be judged in the overall context of global energy, and
specifically, coal markets. Australia is the world’s largest single coal
exporter, but we account for 29 per cent of coal exportation. The rest
comes from various suppliers, ready to fill the gap created by our
withdrawal. Many of these are developing countries with few qualms about
carbon emissions. And our largest buyers are Japan and South Korea, not
emerging giant emitters like China, India, Brazil and Indonesia or major
contemporary emitters like Europe and the US.
Japan, which in 2004-5 bought 54 per cent of our steaming coal and 36
per cent of our coking coal, emits
5 per cent of the world’s carbon. By comparison, the US (24.3 per
cent), the European Union (15.3 per cent) and China (14.5 per cent)
together emit more than half the total.
The dynamic factor in this mix is China, which is set to overtake the US
by 2009. The dimensions of China’s coal consumption are sobering.
According to
Steve Piper of energy information firm Platts, climate change has
done little to spoil the world’s appetite for coal, and China, in
particular, is voracious. More than 361 coal-fired power stations have
been built by the Chinese since 2002, and 65,000 megawatts (MW) worth of
new facilities are under construction. A further 100 stations are
planned. About one coal-burning plant is being added to China’s supply
capacity per week. Although China mined 2.2 billion tonnes of thermal
coal last year, imports have had to rise from two million tonnes in 2001
to 31 million in 2006. The forecast is 36 million this year and 50
million by 2012.
Nor have other countries called a halt. The US has added 27,000 MW of
coal-fired capacity since 2002 and plans to develop another 37,700 MW by
2012. In the meantime, Kyoto-signing Europe added 25,000 MW over the
last five years and plans an extra 13,000 MW by 2012. And India has
projects adding up to 38,000 MW. Overall, 37 countries have plans to
build more coal-fired plants, says Piper. By 2012, the world will have
7,500 coal-fired stations in 79 countries.
In short, coal powers 40 per cent of the world’s electricity production
and the International Energy Agency projects demand to double by 2030.
Will any of this change if we pull the plug? Not much.
Recently, the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
published a wide-ranging study, The
Future of Coal. The study points out that ‘in contrast to oil and
natural gas, coal resources are widely distributed around the world’,
and ‘coal reserves are spread between developed and developing
countries’. One fundamental conclusion: ‘we believe that coal use will
increase under any foreseeable scenario because it is cheap and
abundant’.
While we are the leading coal exporter, moreover, according to US
Department of Energy estimates we only have 8 per cent of the
world’s reserves. The largest reserves are concentrated in the United
States with 26 percent and the Former Soviet Union with 23 percent,
followed by China (12 percent), Germany (7 percent), South Africa (5
percent), Poland (2 percent) and many other countries with smaller
shares. Clearly, there are ample substitutes should we pull out.
What can be done? Despite reports that John Howard is negotiating an
APEC linked regional emissions trading scheme, the Chinese government,
for one, won’t kick the coal habit any time soon. The Communist Party’s
hold on power depends on continuing growth at breakneck speed. As China
specialist David Lambton pointed out in an article republished by the
AFR (from Foreign Affairs), ‘Beijing’s priority is sustained,
rapid growth, because growth is fundamental to the regime’s legitimacy -
and most everything else’. Hence, last month’s National Climate Change
Assessment Report, a document released by China’s top economic planning
body, rejected ‘absolute and compulsory’ caps on the country’s
greenhouse gas emissions.
Nevertheless, the MIT study expresses confidence that ‘carbon capture
sequestration (CCS) is the critical enabling technology that would
reduce [carbon dioxide] emissions significantly while also allowing coal
to meet the world’s pressing energy needs’. The study estimates that a
carbon emission price of $30 (US) per tonne would make CCS cost
competitive. The crucial problem is whether the world’s major emitters
can be persuaded to implement such an impost, and what form it should
take. If, as we have argued,
global emissions trading proves to be a pipedream, the only alternative
is some type of international agreement - a sort of supersized
AP6 - mandating
cooperation in the development, dissemination and application of
technological improvements.
For such an agreement to emerge, coal suppliers need to be backed by
democratically accountable governments, prosperous wealth generating
economies and technically skilled populations. In other words, by
countries like Australia. Now there’s an alternative perspective for
you. If we want to have a real, as opposed to just a symbolic, impact on
stabilising atmospheric carbon, we should think about expanding, rather
than contracting, our share of the world’s coal supply.
This
editorial was republished by
On Line Opinion,
Australia's e-journal of social and political debate.
Carbon trading hasn’t worked – mandate clean
technologies
Foggy weather
A delusional fog seems to have descended on climate change policymaking
in Australia. How else to explain the breathless urgency attending moves
to carbon trading? It’s not just that carbon trading has a dismal track
record. It bears repeating that we produce a puny 1.4 per cent of global
emissions. Assuming global warming is mostly man-made, even if we were
to adopt a national scheme, and even if we hit a drastic target – say a
60 per cent cut by 2050 – the impact would still be next to zilch. As we
have argued, atmospheric carbon will be stabilised by the giants of the
northern hemisphere or not at all. We could reduce or raise our
emissions by 100 per cent and it would make virtually no difference.
Of course, environmentalists will always insist ‘we must play our part’.
Speaking on the ABC’s 7:30 Report, for instance, Professor Graeme
Pearman, Sustainability Science Coordinator at Monash University,
recently delivered the stock
reply: ‘If you look at the emissions of
Australia, they’re not that different from the emissions of the UK or
from France, or from Sweden. All of these countries have emissions that
are approximately the same. So each of these countries could put up
their hand and say, “We’re going to opt out of doing anything, because
no-one else is doing it”. We have to share the responsibility for
actually doing this emissions reduction.’
Australia can’t answer for Europe, and Professor Pearman ignores a host
of factors distinguishing us from countries like Britain and France.
Consider their longer industrial histories. Consider that their
fossil-fuel reserves have already been substantially depleted or
abandoned, spurring a decades-old switch – unrelated to climate change –
towards energy alternatives like nuclear. Consider their status as
powerful players in the European Union, a grouping of 27 nations with a
combined population of close to 500 million. The EU emits about 14 per
cent of the world’s carbon, ten times as much as Australia, population
20 million.
It’s premature to say we should do nothing. We shouldn’t, however, be
rushed into an outcome that is wrong for Australia. And yet a wrong
outcome is what we’re about to get. As the media repeats ad nauseam,
‘some type of carbon trading scheme is inevitable’. Every sensible
person knows, for reasons alluded to above, that absent a functioning
multilateral framework, independent a